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COMMUNICATIONS REGULATION-RIPE
FOR REFORM
Kevin Ryan1
Of all the federal agencies and commissions, the [Federal Communications Commis-
sion] is the one that Americans ought to be most interested in; after all, it is involved
with a business sector that accounts for about fifteen percent of the American econ-
omy, as well as important aspects of daily life-telephone and television and radio
and newspapers and the Internet.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly thirty years after early predictions and much fanfare,2 convergence
has finally arrived in the communications industry Now, consumers can
watch television programs on computers and mobile phones and read the New
York Times on their digital music player. The mantra of the convergence para-
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Nicholas Lemann, The Chairman, NEW YORKER, Oct. 7, 2002, at 48.
2 See James B. Speta, Making Spectrum Reform "Thinkable," 4 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 183, 184 (2005) [hereinafter Speta, Thinkable Reform] (citing ITHIEL DE SOLA
POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 8 (1983) (discussing convergence)); see William H. Read
& Ronald Alan Weiner, FCC Reform: Governing Requires a New Standard, 49 FED. COMM.
L.J. 289, 291 (1997) ("The telephone, television and computer are rapidly merging into a
single, very intelligent box-a telecomputer... [that] will be linked to the rest of the world
by high-capacity smart wires." (quoting George Gilder, Cable's Secret Weapon, FORBES,
Apr. 13, 1992, at 80, 84)).
3 See Richard E. Wiley, "A New Telecom Act"-Remarks, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 17, 22-23
(2006). Convergence has been given a variety of definitions, including "the use of the same
technological platform to provide multiple services." Id. at 17. For the purpose of this
Comment, convergence encompasses three overlapping and interweaving components: (1)
the digitization of communications content, replacing the traditional analog format; (2) the
expansion of traditionally separate service offerings by businesses-for example, cable
companies offering telephone service; and (3) the integration of devices, allowing mobile
devices to provide, among other things, telephone, television, and Internet access. See John
C. Roberts, The Sources of Statutory Meaning: An Archaeological Case Study of the 1996
Telecommunications Act, 53 SMU L. REv. 143, 156-57 (2000).
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digm shift is whatever content you want, whenever you want it, and on what-
ever device you want it.4 On-demand video services and Intemet-based video
may be replacing the top-down model of traditional over-the-air television
broadcasting.' Traditional landline telephone companies are bleeding custom-
ers who have become un-tethered-relying only on their mobile phones.6 Sat-
ellite radio and other Intemet-based music sources, such as podcasting,7 are
supplementing traditional AM and FM broadcast radio industry formats.8
While convergence can be observed plainly in today's consumer marketplace,
the underlying technological cause making convergence possible is the digi-
talization of the content consumers receive and send: voice, data, audio, and
video.9
4 See, e.g., OLIVER WYMAN, THE UPSIDE FOR CONVERGED COMMUNICATIONS IN NORTH
AMERICA 3 (2008), http://www.oliverwyman.com/ow/pdf files/OWEN CMTPUBL_
2008_UpsideforConvergedCommunications.pdf (explaining that growth in the communica-
tions industry "will be fueled by consumers' and business' ever-increasing desire for any-
where, anytime, anyplace communications connectivity, information exchange, and content
viewing"); New Technologies, COMM. DAILY, Oct. 8, 2008, at 14 (noting the Society of
Motion Picture and Television Engineers has started to develop "a broadband content deliv-
ery technical standard" with the goal of letting consumers buy content from any online des-
tination and play it back on any device).
5 See Posting of Bill Gorman to TV by the Numbers, Today's Threat to Broadcast TV
Networks, http://tvbythenumbers.com/2009/02/28/todays-threat-to-broadcast-tv-networks/
13686 (Feb. 28, 2009). Using data from Nielsen Media Research, Bill Gorman estimated
that the prime-time audience for broadcast networks has fallen from nearly eighty-five per-
cent in 1984-85 to under fifty percent in 2007-08. Posting of Bill Gorman to TV by the
Numbers, Broadcast Prime-time for 2008-09: Look Out Below!, http://tvbythenumbers.
com/2008/09/19/broadcast-prime-time-for-2008-9-look-out-below/5182 (Sept. 19, 2008).
6 Stephen J. Blumberg & Julian V. Luke, WIRELESS SUBSTITUTION: EARLY RELEASE OF
ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, JANUARY-JUNE 2008, at 1
(2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/wireless200812.pdf.
This 2008 study, conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics, found that 17.5% of
U.S. households had no landline telephone, and an additional 13.3% that did have a landline
service received "all or almost all calls on wireless telephones." Id.
7 PC Magazine, Encyclopedia, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/ (search for "pod-
cast") (last visited Mar. 21, 2009) (defining a podcast as "[a]n audio broadcast that has been
converted to an MP3 file or other audio file format for playback in a digital music player").
8 BILL ROSE & JOE LENSKI, ARBITRON INC. & EDISON MEDIA RESEARCH, THE INFINITE
DIAL 2008: RADIO'S DIGITAL PLATFORMS 3-4, 22 (2008), available at http://www.arbitron.
com/downloads/digital radiostudy_2008.pdf. While AM and FM radio's audience has
remained fairly stable, the study found that MP3 audio player usage, Internet radio listening,
and podcasting continue to grow dramatically.
9 See Kevin Werbach, Digital Tornado: The Internet and Telecommunications Policy 5
(Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, OPP Working Paper No. 29, 1997) [hereinafter Werbach, Digital
Tornado], available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp29.pdf.
Digitalization means that all of the formerly distinct content types are reduced to a
stream of binary ones and zeroes, which can be carried by any delivery platform. In
practical terms, this means not only that specific boundaries-between a telephone
network and a cable system, for example-are blurred, but also that the very exercise
of drawing any such boundaries must be fundamentally reconsidered or abandoned.
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However, this radical shift in the capability of devices, transmission meth-
ods, and content creation has not spurred a significant shift in the regulatory
framework of the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commis-
sion"), which oversees the communications industry.'" Both the Commission's
bureaucratic structure and regulatory framework remain industry-based."
Often directed at the Commission's outdated regulatory structure and opera-
tions, scores of complaints from a variety of stakeholders have been leveled at
the FCC, often directed at the Commission's outdated regulatory structure and
associated operations. Former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt, for example, la-
mented the courts' reversal rate of FCC actions is "scandalously high."' 2 Addi-
tionally, numerous groups criticized the FCC for voting to admonish Comcast
for violating the FCC's Internet policy principles, which themselves are mired
in a debate about their enforceability. 3 Finally, the Commission received criti-
cism for placing overly stringent requirements on the 700 MHz D-Block public
safety network spectrum auction, setting back the development of an interoper-
able network for first responders by months, if not years. 4 Finally, criticisms
concerning the FCC's operational procedures grew so loud that the House of
Representatives' Energy and Commerce Committee began a congressional
Id. (citations omitted). See generally NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL (1995) (pro-
viding an overview of the impacts of digitalization). Not to be overlooked in discussing the
digitalization of content is the rise of more convenient consumer electronic devices on
which the digitalized content can be accessed. The advances in such devices can in large
part be attributable to Moore's Law. Susan Ness, Preface, 7 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 229,
299 (1999) (defining Moore's Law as the doubling of "processing power available at a
given price ... approximately every 18 months").
lo See Jessica Finely, Comment, Anticipating Regulation of New Telecommunications
Technologies: An Argument for the European Model, 26 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 447, 447
(2006).
11 See id. ("Regulation of telephone, broadcast communication, and wired communica-
tions, such as the internet and cable television, are still segregated and do not account for
overlap among the various telecommunication modalities.")
12 Reed E. Hundt & Gregory L. Rosston, Communications Policy for 2006 and Beyond,
58 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 33 (citing Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir.
2004); U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
13 Compare Posting of Harold Feld to Public Knowledge Policy Blog, Why Comcast
Can't Appeal-A Story of Prior Notice and Procedural Problems, http://www.
publicknowledge.org/node/1670 (July 22, 2008, 17:39 EST) (arguing that because Comcast
participated in an adjudication where the FCC established that it had authority to enforce its
Internet policy principles and "would review future complaints... [Comcast] had an obliga-
tion to seek reconsideration or judicial review" at that time), with BARBARA S. ESBIN, "THE
LAW IS WHATEVER THE NOBLES Do": UNDUE PROCESS AT THE FCC, PROGRESS AND FREEDOM
FOUND. PROGRESS ON POINT No. 15.12, at 3-5 (2008) (arguing that the FCC's Comcast deci-
sion was procedurally and substantively flawed in failing to go through the Commission's
rule-making process and improperly relying on Title I ancillary jurisdiction).
14 See Spencer S. Hsu & Cecilia Kang, FCC Asked to Probe Auction: Failure of Public
Safety Band to Draw Bids Raises Suspicion, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2008, at D1.
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investigation."
With a new Presidential administration and a strengthened Democratic Con-
gress that has expressed significant interest in communications issues, 6 the
time is right for reforming the bureaucratic and regulatory framework of the
FCC. In recognition of the need for change at the Commission, members of
Congress over the past few years have introduced legislation to expand over-
sight over the FCC's structure and operations.17 Like any other industry-
specific regulatory agency experiencing fundamental changes in the industry it
oversees, the FCC needs to adapt its outdated regulatory structure to account
for the paradigm-shift brought on by convergence. While even former FCC
commissioners have noted the need for reforming the agency,' 8 the regulatory
models and their associated public policy goals remain remarkably similar to
the original framework established in 1934, when the FCC was formed.'9 In
15 See John Eggerton, House Launches FCC Investigations; Warns Against Destroying
Documents, BROAD. & CABLE, Jan. 8, 2008, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/
CA6518202.html.
16 See, e.g., Edward Markey, U.S. Representative, Keynote Address at the Consumer
Federation of America's Consumer Assembly (Feb. 1, 2007), available at
http://markey.house.gov/index.php?option=com content&task=view&id=2577&Itemid =
141 (stating the Telecommunications and Internet Subcommittee of the Energy and Com-
merce Committee in the House of Representatives will be very active in oversight regarding
the communications issues). At a hearing of the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and
the Internet of the 110th Congress, Rep. Markey said, "In particular, our oversight will ana-
lyze whether it is operating at maximum efficiency, what constructive proposals can be
considered to improve its operations, whether it is adhering to congressional intent in im-
plementing our Nation's laws and to what extent its policy agenda advances the public in-
terest." Oversight of the Federal Communications Commission: Hearing Before the H. Sub-
comm. On Telecommunications and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Rep. Markey, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Telecommuni-
cations and the Internet) The new Chairman of the Subcommittee on Telecommunications
and the Internet, Rep. Rick Boucher, has indicated a similar interest in communications
issues. Satellite, Broadband, DTV Top Telecom Agenda This Congress, Comm. Daily,
March 20, 2009 at 1.
17 E.g., FCC Reorganization Act, H.R. Res. 2982, 109th Cong. §§ 2-3 (2005) (forcing
the FCC to reorganize its operational structure); see John Eggerton, Barton Bill Would
Overhaul FCC, BROAD. & CABLE, July 31, 2008, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/ arti-
cle/9541 1-Barton Bill WouldOverhaulFCC.php (discussing a draft bill by Rep. Joe Bar-
ton (R-Tex.) that would make the FCC's process "more transparent and accountable").
18 See, e.g., Glen 0. Robinson, The FCC in the Year 2000, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 155,
158-59 (1985) [hereinafter Robinson, FCC 2000]; Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Strategic
Plan: A New FCC for the 21st Century 15 (1999), http://www.fcc.gov/21st century/
draft_strategicplan.pdf [hereinafter FCC Strategic Plan]; PHILIP J. WEISER, FCC REFORM
AND THE FUTURE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 4 (2009), available at http://fcc-
reform.org/sites/fcc-reform.org/files/weiser-20090105.pdf (quoting former FCC Commis-
sioner Glen Robinson and former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt, both of whom criticized and
critiqued the FCC's operations and effectiveness).
19 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (2000); Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat.
1064.
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light of technological convergence and shifting regulatory paradigms, the
Commission's organizational structure and the regulatory framework it applies
need to adapt to address the needs of industry and consumers adequately. To
facilitate reform, the Telecommunications Act of 199620 should be amended in
order to move policy-making functions currently at the FCC to the executive
branch, leaving the Commission jurisdiction to serve an adjudicatory role-
overseeing interconnection disputes and spectrum interference.
This Comment argues that the FCC's regulatory models are outdated and
examines possible remedies for solving the shortcomings of the current regula-
tory models. Part II of this Comment explores the origins of the FCC from the
Interstate Commerce Commission to the 1934 Communications Act through
the present day, including the legislative history and policy rationales behind
key statutes, such as the Radio Act of 1927 and the Telecommunications Act
of 1996. In Part III, the Comment examines the FCC's five regulatory models
and their concomitant public policy goals. 2' The Comment then explains the
current structure and regulatory framework of the FCC, surveying the array of
criticisms of the FCC and evaluating possible reform options suggested by
other commentators in Part IV. Finally, in Part V, this Comment concludes by
offering suggestions to bring the regulatory framework for communications
into the twenty-first century by calling for a major update to the 1996 Tele-
communications Act. This legislation would remove policy-making powers
from the FCC and transfer that power to the executive branch and other inde-
pendent agencies, preempt most state regulation of the communications indus-
try, and allow the FCC to focus on adjudicatory tasks, such as spectrum dis-
putes and interconnection obligations.
II. HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
The FCC can easily be labeled one of the New Deal alphabet soup regula-
20 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
21 The Commission's five primary regulatory models are: the no-regulation print model;
the common carrier telephone model; the public trustee broadcast radio and television
model; the hybrid common carrier and public trustee cable television model; and the Inter-
net and information services model. PHILIP M. NAPOLI, FOUNDATIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS
POLICY: PRINCIPLES AND PROCESS IN THE REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA 2 (2001); see
BARBARA S. ESBN, FCC REFORM: SCALPEL OR STEAMROLLER?, PROGRESS AND FREEDOM
FOUND. PROGRESS ON POINT 15.15, at 5 (2008) [hereinafter, ESBIN, SCALPEL OR STEAMROL-
LER] (stating that broadband services are being treated as "unregulated 'information ser-
vices' subject only to [the FCC's] 'ancillary jurisdiction"'); cf Cheryl A. Tritt, Telecommu-
nications Future, in 25TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND REGU-
LATION 133, 152-54 (PLI Intellectual Property Course Handbook Series No. 990, 2007)
(describing the Internet and information services model in the context of the Commission's
actions regarding Voice over Internet Protocol services).
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tory agencies created during the Great Depression,22 but the formation of the
FCC reflects a more complicated history dating back to the Interstate Com-
merce Act of 1887.23 To understand the FCC's regulatory models fully, it is
necessary to understand the history of those models and the statutes that gave
rise to the regulatory agency implementing those models.
A. Pre-1934 Act Regulation
The first regulatory body of importance to communications regulation was
the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC").24 The ICC was formed because
of the importance of railroad transportation in the late nineteenth century to the
creation of an interconnected national economy. 5 The regulation of the rail-
roads was the next chapter of common carrier laws that had governed previous
transportation technologies, such as canals and stagecoaches.26 Because the
transportation industries had a significant impact on the public, government
regulation sought to ensure reasonable prices27 and non-discrimination in the
22 See Randolph J. May, The FCC's Tumultuous Year 2003: An Essay on an Opportu-
nity for Institutional Agency Reform, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1307, 1310 (2004) (comparing the
FCC with the other "independent regulatory agencies" that came out of the "somewhat ide-
alized Progressive-era and New Deal vision of government administration").
23 Glen 0. Robinson, The Federal Communications Act: An Essay on Origins and
Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, at
3, 3 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989) [hereinafter Robinson, Federal Communications Origins]
(arguing that, unlike the other regulatory statutes passed from 1933-38, the Communica-
tions Act did not create a new regulatory structure because the statute had roots in the Inter-
state Commerce Act of 1887 and the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910). Furthermore, the FCC was
not a completely new government agency, but instead was "a reorganization of the Federal
Radio Commission with the addition of the [Interstate Commerce Commission]'s jurisdic-
tion over telecommunications carriers." Id; see Harry M. Shooshan III, A Modest Proposal
for Restructuring the Federal Communications Commission, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 637, 641
(1998) (calling "[t]he new statute ... largely a recodification of the 1927 Radio Act and the
Interstate Commerce Act").
24 Charles J. Cooper & Brian Stuart Koukoutchos, Federalism and the Telephone: The
Case for Preemptive Federal Deregulation in the New World of Intermodal Competition, 6
J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 293, 307 (2008) (describing the ICC as "the first federal
regulatory commission" and noting its role in the regulation of "common carriers engaged in
interstate transportation").
25 Read & Weiner, supra note 2, at 307-08.
26 Kenneth A. Cox & William J. Byrnes, The Common Carrier Provisions-A Product
of Evolutionary Development, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF
1934, at 26 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989) (describing the underlying theory behind common
carrier law as a prohibition against discrimination of individuals and locations).
27 See William J. Byrnes, Telecommunications Regulation: Something Old and Some-
thing New, in THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MAJOR AMEND-
MENTS, 1934-1996, at 32 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1999) [hereinafter Byrnes, Something New]
(discussing the development of "reasonable" rates being based upon carrier costs as a prod-
uct of the common law); cf. Read & Weiner, supra note 2, at 305.
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form of universal service. 8 In addition, the ICC's statutory power to prevent
antitrust review of proposed railroad mergers that were in the interest of the
public provided the first glimpse of the natural monopoly theory that would
later form a key plank in communications regulations.29
Consistent with the goal of creating interconnected networks, Congress
passed the Mann-Elkins Act in 1910, which presented perhaps the first legisla-
tive recognition of the need for widespread access to interconnected telephone
and telegraph technologies. ° The Mann-Elkins Act defined telephone compa-
nies as common carriers for the first time,3' subjecting them to ICC regulatory
oversight and the common carrier obligations of non-discrimination and rate
regulation that were applied to the railroad industry.32 The Mann-Elkins Act
also granted the ICC enforcement powers over interstate telecommunications,
including preemption over intrastate regulation.3 This is a marked difference
from the Communications Act of 1934, which granted regulatory powers to
both the FCC and the individual states.34 This distinction proved to have major
implications for the FCC's regulatory powers. However, prior to the Commu-
nications Act of 1934, intervening events led to incremental regulatory
changes.
In the wake of the Titanic disaster, Congress passed the Radio Act of 1912, 3s
28 Read & Weiner, supra note 2, at 307-08.
29 Id.
30 See Mann-Elkins Act, ch. 309, sec. 7, § 1, 36 Stat. 539, 544-47 (1910).
31 Id. (establishing that the provisions of the Mann-Elkins Act apply to "telegraph, tele-
phone, and cable companies[, and they] .. .shall be considered and held to be common
carriers); see Jim Chen, The Legal Process and Political Economy of Telecommunications
Reform, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 835, 838-39 (1997).
32 See Cox & Byrnes, supra note 26, at 28-29; Michael Zarkin, The Evolution of Bu-
reaucratic Design: The Federal Communications Regulatory Bureaucracy, 1910-1952, at 7
(Mar. 17, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Zarkin, Evolution of Bureaucratic
Design], available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p97330_index.html. The ICC was
given authority over the telephone lines partially because telegraph and telephone compa-
nies "had deployed their lines heavily along rail rights-of-way, [thus] the Interstate Com-
merce Commission ... regulated them for years as a sort of adjunct." Rosemary C. Harold,
Cable Open Access: Exorcising the Ghosts of "Legacy" Regulation, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 721,
730 (2001).
33 Cooper & Koukoutchos, supra note 24, at 314-15; see also Houston, E. & W. Tex.
Ry. Co. v. United States (The Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342, 351-52 (1914) (recog-
nizing that in network-based industries, the setting of interstate rates and intrastate rates are
too intertwined for the government to be able to regulate one, but not the other).
34 Barbara S. Esbin & Gary S. Lutzker, Poles, Holes and Cable Open Access: Where the
Global Information Superhighway Meets the Local Right-of- Way, 10 CoMMLAW CONSPEC-
Tus 23, 29 (2001) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (2000)).
35 Read & Weiner, supra note 2, at 294; Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302 (re-
pealed by Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 39, 44 Stat. 1162, 1174). For a brief discussion of
the role of the Titanic's sinking in the passage of the Radio Act of 1912, see John F. Duffy,
The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian Realism, and The Technol-
ogy of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1071, 1097 n.98 (2000).
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giving authority to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor to issue broadcast
licenses.36 The federal government's first foray into regulation of radio spec-
trum, the Radio Act of 1912 did not give any "independent discretion or rule-
making power" to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, forcing a "first-
come, first-served" system for the licensing of radio frequencies without "dis-
cretion to deny or revoke a license."37 Despite the lack of authority to deny li-
censes, this regulatory regime worked fairly well prior to the explosive growth
in the number of radio stations during World War 1.38 This growth created sig-
nificant interference problems between broadcast licensees. 9
With the growth of commercial broadcasting after World War I,40 numerous
concerns about the licensing system arose, including a fear that placing author-
ity in the executive branch would lead to politicization of licensing distribu-
tion.41 However, Congress did not act to allay these concerns until a federal
district court found that the Radio Act of 1912 did not provide the Secretary of
Commerce and Labor the power to issue regulations regarding exclusive dis-
tribution of frequencies.42 This decision prompted widespread chaos in the
36 Radio Act of 1912, 37 Stat. at 302-03; see Duffy, supra note 35, at 1097; Zarkin,
Evolution of Bureaucratic Design, supra note 32, at 7.
37 Zarkin, Evolution of Bureaucratic Design, supra note 32, at 7-8.
38 Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210 (1943); Judith C. Aarons, Note,
Cross-Ownership's Last Stand? The Federal Communication Commission's Proposal Con-
cerning the Repeal of the Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership Rule, 13 FORDHAM IN-
TELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 317, 322 (2002). But see Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scar-
city, Rent Seeking, and the First Amendment, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 905, 912, 917-18, 922,
(1997) [hereinafter Hazlett, Physical Scarcity] (arguing that then Secretary of Commerce
Herbert Hoover sought to exert greater control over radio licensees as a tool for political
gain, and that courts were already beginning to solve the interference problem through issu-
ance of property rights for portions of the spectrum).
39 Nat'lBroad. Co., 319 U.S. at 211.
40 See Zarkin, Evolution of Bureaucratic Design, supra note 32, at 8. While the initial
impetus for the Radio Act was concern over confusion and interference regarding the spec-
trum, the rise of commercial broadcasting in the 1920s brought new pressures on the regula-
tory framework. Id. The key differences in commercial broadcasting as compared to "navi-
gational operators" were that the audiences for commercial broadcasters were the public at
large and that the scarcity of radio frequencies meant that the "range of perspectives and
ideas broadcast over the airwaves might be limited in scope." Id.
41 See Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, supra note 38, at 920; May, supra note 22, at 1311.
Congress foresaw political implications in allowing the executive branch control of the new
medium. May, supra note 22, at 1311.
42 Robinson, Federal Communications Origins, supra note 23, at 9; Duffy, supra note
35, at 1100-01; see also United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 617-18 (N.D. I11.
1926) (finding that the Secretary of Commerce had no power to regulate the airwaves). The
Zenith case was brought with the encouragement of the Secretary of Commerce Herbert
Hoover, who had pushed Congress to grant the Department of Commerce greater authority
in the regulation of the broadcast industry. Zarkin, Evolution of Bureaucratic Design, supra
note 32, at 9; see also Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, supra note 38, at 917. Faced with congres-
sional inaction, Hoover "encouraged the Zenith Corporation to bring a test case in the fed-
[Vol. 17
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broadcast industry, and Congress responded by creating the Federal Radio
Commission ("FRC") through the Radio Act of 1927 ("Radio Act").43
Three beliefs converged to create a multi-member, independent commission
to oversee the licensing of the public airwaves. First, only experts in the radio
industry and technically skilled personnel could handle regulating the com-
plexities of the electromagnetic spectrum.' Second, broadcasting was a me-
dium capable of vast political influence, necessitating regulation independent
of a political executive branch.45 Third, a belief by members of the broadcast
industry that a single executive branch appointee would lead to increased cen-
sorship. 6 The Radio Act replaced the "first-come, first-served"'47 license proc-
ess with a grant of authority to the FRC to issue licenses when "the public in-
terest, convenience, or necessity would be served." '48 However, unresolved con-
cerns regarding the power that broadcasters had in controlling the airwaves
prompted Congress to implement new laws to assure a diversity of voices, in-
cluding rules requiring equal time for political candidates. 9
The justification for the public interest standard was that radio spectrum was
scarce and belonged to the public, but was licensed by the government to pri-
vate companies for profit.5 Within the public interest standard, the FRC devel-
oped public policy principles that included localism, diversity of broadcasting
programming, the ability to broadcast without interference, and the clean char-
acter of licensees.5 However, with little justification, the Radio Act was super-
seded by another, broader communications act, which created a new regulatory
agency.
B. The 1934 Act to the 1996 Act-Technological Innovation and Regulatory
eral courts challenging his broad interpretation of the Radio Act." Zarkin, Evolution of Bu-
reaucratic Design, supra note 32, at 9. Contra Duffy, supra note 35, at 1102 (noting "no
hard evidence" supports the contention that Hoover sought the decision in Zenith).
43 See Duffy, supra note 35, at 1102; Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169 § 3, 44 Stat. 1162,
1162-63 (repealed 1934).
44 See S. REP. No. 69-772, at 2 (1926).
45 Zarkin, Evolution of Bureaucratic Design, supra note 32, at 11; see S. REP. No. 69-
772, at 2.
46 Zarkin, Evolution of Bureaucratic Design, supra note 32, at 10-11.
47 See Duffy, supra note 35, at 1100-01; Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, supra note 38, at
913.
48 Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169 § 11, 44 Stat. 1162, 1167 (repealed 1934); see Duffy,
supra note 35, at 1100-01.
49 Andrea L. Johnson, Redefining Diversity in Telecommunications: Uniform Regula-
tory Framework for Mass Communications, 26 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 87, 95 (1992); see 67
CONG. REc. 5558 (1926).
50 See Read & Weiner, supra note 2, at 293-95.
51 NAPOLI, supra note 21, at 83.
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Divergence
The Communications Act of 1934 ("Communications Act" or "1934 Act")
took the regulation of radio communications from the FRC and telephone-
telegraph service from the ICC and placed them under the same regulatory
umbrella. 2 Evidence of Congress's rationale for combining these regulatory
models is scant; 3 President Franklin Roosevelt's message to Congress accom-
panying the proposed legislation simply referred to the "clarity and effective-
ness" of merging these disparate regulatory functions into one agency. 4
The new communications scheme of the 1934 Act had three primary sec-
tions, or Titles, each of which corresponded to different types of technology or
regulatory objectives. Title I created the FCC, the purpose of which was to
regulate interstate communication by wire and radio in an effort to extend the
technologies to all Americans and create a nation-wide communication appara-
tus.
55
Title II of the Communications Act addressed the regulation of the tele-
phone and telegraph common carriers, incorporating the regulatory structure of
the Mann-Elkins Act. 6 The common carrier regulatory model was bome out of
the natural monopoly theory of public utilities: some industries function better
without competition, especially those industries that are so critical to society as
a whole that government regulation is necessary to ensure reasonable price
points and widespread deployment. 7
52 Robinson, Federal Communications Origins, supra note 23, at 3-4.
53 Id. at 4 (explaining that the legislative history of the 1934 Act does not explain why
the regulatory portfolios were combined). Robinson suggests the assumed goals of the 1934
Act were an increase in administrative efficiency, a clearer regulatory policy, and a more
active regulatory body. Id. In contrast, the ICC presided over a mere fourteen cases involv-
ing telephone-telegraph rates in the twenty-four years the agency had jurisdiction. Id. at 7;
see also Michael J. Hirrel, Oil and Vinegar: The FCC and the D.C. Circuit, 3 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 121, 122 (1995) (suggesting another rationale for creating a central regulatory
body for communications was the ICC's disinterest in using the authority granted to it by
the Mann-Elkins Act).
54 Zarkin, Evolution of Bureaucratic Design, supra note 32, at 14.
55 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652 § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (codified as amended
at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000)).
56 See Robinson, Federal Communications Origins, supra note 23, at 5 (noting that the
obligations imposed on common carriers in the 1934 Act "are largely transplants" from
railroad regulation).
57 KIMBERLY A. ZARKIN & MICHAEL J. ZARKIN, THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COM-
MISSION: FRONT LINE IN THE CULTURE AND REGULATION WARS 2-3 (2006) [hereinafter
ZARKIN & ZARKIN, REGULATION WARS]; Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its
Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548, 548 (1969).
The term [natural monopoly] does not refer to the actual number of sellers in a market
but to the relationship between demand and the technology of supply. If the entire de-
mand within a relevant market can be satisfied at lowest cost by one firm rather than by
two or more, the market is a natural monopoly, whatever the actual number of firms in
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Finally, Title III of the 1934 Act addressed radio communication regula-
tion. 8 This Title borrowed the licensing system standard of "public conven-
ience, interest, or necessity" from the Radio Act and charged the administra-
tion of licenses under this standard to the newly created FCC.59 The Communi-
cations Act provided the primary statutory authority for FCC regulation for the
next sixty years. 60 However, as innovation constantly reshaped the telecommu-
nications industry in the later half of the twentieth century, the FCC often
struggled to keep up with the shifting industry it oversaw.6'
With only landline telephone service, television and radio network broad-
cast, and Western Union under its jurisdiction, the FCC was considered a
"sleepy backwater government agency"" until the 1960s. While many com-
mentators point to the FCC's deregulation trend beginning in President Ronald
Reagan's administration, 63 the actual roots of deregulation and the move to-
ward competition policy began in the 1950s.' The evolution was born from
technological advances, aided by a growing ideological fervor for deregula-
tion,65 and achieved through the development of institutional policy analysis. 66
it.
Id.
58 See Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 301, 48 Stat. 1064, 1081 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000)).
59 Compare Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 11, 44 Stat. 1162, 1167 (repealed 1934), with
Communications Act 1934, ch. 652, § 303, 48 Stat. 1064, 1082. See also Hirrel, supra note
53, at 123.
60 May, supra note 22, at 1307.
61 Id. at 1318.
62 Id. at 1307.
63 Susan Low Bloch, Orphaned Rules in the Administrative State: The Fairness Doc-
trine and Other Orphaned Progeny of Interactive Deregulation, 76 GEO. L.J. 59, 60 n.4
(1987) ("The movement to deregulate communications began in the 1970s during the Carter
Administration and 'accelerated to a gallop' with President Reagan's election and subse-
quent appointment of Mark Fowler as FCC Chairman." (citing JEREMY TUNSTALL, COMMU-
NICATIONS DEREGULATION: THE UNLEASHING OF AMERICA'S COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 30
(1986)). Reagan's deregulation efforts were not confined to the micro-policy level, but were
part of a concerted effort to exert greater presidential control over regulatory agencies. See,
e.g., James F. Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President: An
Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DUKE L.J. 851, 858-60 (2001) (explain-
ing that while previous administrations had "attempt[ed] to expand presidential influence
over ... federal agencies," no attempt was as drastic as President Reagan's); see also Chad
Raphael, The FCC's Broadcast News Distortion Rules: Regulation by Drooping Eyelid, 6
COMM. L. & POL'Y 485, 501 (2001) (describing a sharp decline in the FCC's findings of
news distortion, particularly after 1982, "when the... FCC began to remove content regula-
tions on broadcast news").
64 Charles G. Moerdler, Deregulation-The United States Experience, 6 HOFSTRA LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 177, 177-78 (1989) (suggesting the deregulation movement began in academic
circles in the late 1950s).
65 See ZARKIN & ZARKIN, REGULATION WARS, supra note 57, at 6 ("Ultimately, how-
ever, new technological innovations combined with political pressure for policy change
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Deregulation initiated by the FCC began in the 1950s with ruling on the use of
two communications devices, the Hush-a-Phone and the Carterfone 7
Both the Hush-a-Phone and the Carterfone devices challenged AT&T's
long-imposed prohibition against foreign attachments to its telephone net-
work. 8 Initially, the Commission refused to authorize the attachment of either
device, relying on AT&T's ban on foreign attachments as their justification.69
After the inventor of the Hush-a-Phone brought a suit contesting the decision,
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit forced the Commission to allow con-
nection of the device.7 ° Following its experience with Hush-a-Phone, the FCC
promised to examine AT&T's ban on network attachments more closely.7 The
Carterfone Decision, which only prohibited the attachment of equipment that
caused actual harm," opened up the telephone equipment market to non-AT&T
owned companies for the first time." This, in turn, sparked a burst of techno-
forced the FCC to fully confront the issue of competition by the end of the 1970s."). See
generally Andrew Downer Crain, Ford, Carter, and Deregulation in the 1970s, 5 J. TELE-
COMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 413, 415-37 (2007) (providing a comprehensive overview of Presi-
dent Ford's and President Carter's efforts to deregulate the transportation industry and not-
ing the growing consensus at the time that both the industry and consumers would benefit
from deregulation).
66 See NAPOLI, supra note 21, at 265-66 (suggesting that prior to the Kennedy admini-
stration, regulatory bodies relied on "intuition and experience, as opposed to empirical
analysis" and arguing that the rise of empirical analysis in regulatory agencies brought about
a cost-benefit approach to the development of new regulations). President Reagan formally
mandated a cost-benefit analysis of agency rulemaking through the President's Office of
Management and Budget ("OMB"). David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming
Administrative Law in an Age ofAgency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1108-
09 (2008).
67 See ZARKIN & ZARKIN, REGULATION WARS, supra note 57, at 61.
68 Id. at 61-62; see In re Hush-A-Phone Corporation and Harry C. Tuttle, Complain-
ants; American Telephone and Telegraph Company, et al., Defendants, Decision, 20 F.C.C.
391, 1-2 (Dec. 21, 1955) [hereinafter Hush-A-Phone Decision]; In re Use of the Carter-
fone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service; In re Thomas F. Carter and Carter Elec-
tronics Corp., Dallas, Tex. (Complainants), v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co.,
Associated Bell System Companies, Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., and General Tele-
phone Co. of the Southwest (Defendants), Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 420-21 (June 26,
1968) [hereinafter Carterfone Decision].
69 ZARKIN & ZARKIN, REGULATION WARS, supra note 57, at 61-62 (explaining that with
regard to the earlier Hush-A-Phone Decision, the FCC staff recognized that the device posed
little threat to the network, but rather feared that one exception would lead to many changes,
and with regard to the Carterfone Decision that the FCC staff acted under pressure from
AT&T); see also Hush-A-Phone Decision, supra note 68, 1-3, 19; Carterfone Decision,
supra note 68, at 420-23.
70 See Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 268-69 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
71 Chen, supra note 31, at 844.
72 Carterfone Decision, supra note 68, at 423-24.
73 See ZARKIN & ZARKIN, REGULATION WARS, supra note 57, at 62.
[Vol. 17
FCC Reform
logical innovation74 including a boom in computer processing and related ser-
vices.75
In response to the convergence of computer data processing services and
traditional telecommunication services, the FCC instituted what would become
known as Computer Inquiries.76 These inquires spanned several decades and
generated numerous offspring, but resulted in three major decisions: Computer
I, Computer II, and Computer IL.77 In its Computer I decision, the FCC issued
two major rules.7" First, the Commission found that since the market for data
processing services was competitive, those services would not be subject to
Title II common carrier regulation.79 Second, the FCC encouraged traditional
telephone service providers to enter the data processing services market,
known as enhanced services, but only if they established a separate business
entity with its own personnel and facilities."0 The FCC believed that local tele-
74 See H. James Nelson, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: How It Failed, and How
It Succeeded (But Not As Expected), 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 2 (2006) (noting the development of
answering machines and computer modems as a result of the Carterfone Decision).
75 See Kevin Werbach, The Federal Computer Commission, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1, 21
(2005) (arguing that the Carterfone Decision was the initial step by the FCC that "paved the
way" for computer communications).
76 In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer
and Communication Services and Facilities, Notice of Inquiry, 7 F.C.C.2d 11 1-2 (Nov.
9, 1966) [hereinafter Computer I Inquiry]. The FCC called traditional telecommunications
service "basic service," which encompassed "the common carrier offering of transmission
capacity for the movement of information" and defined "enhanced services" as "service
combin[ing] basic service with computer processing applications that act on the format,
content, code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information, or
provide the subscriber additional, different, or restructured information, or involve sub-
scriber interaction with stored information." In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77
F.C.C.2d 384, 5 (Apr. 7, 1980) [hereinafter Computer H Decision]; see Harold, supra note
32, at 732; James B. Speta, Deregulating Telecommunications in Internet Time, 61 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1063, 1083-84 (2004) [hereinafter Speta, Internet Time]; ZARKIN & ZARKIN,
REGULATION WARS, supra note 57, at 69-72.
77 Harold, supra note 32, at 732.
78 See In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Com-
puter and Communications Services and Facilities, Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d
267, 285-86 (Mar. 10, 197 1) [hereinafter Computer I Decision].
79 Id. 11; see In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence
of Computer and Communications Services and Facilities, Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d
290, 20-23 (Apr. 3, 1970) [hereinafter Computer I Tentative Decision]; see also Harold,
supra note 32, at 733.
80 Computer I Decision, supra note 78, 11-20; Computer I Tentative Decision, supra
note 79, 36; see Herbert E. Marks, The Computer Inquiry Trilogy, in TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS: LAW, REGULATION, AND POLICY 187, 189 (Walt Sapronov & William H. Read, eds.,
1998) (summarizing Computer I and noting it only applied to non-Bell System telephone
companies, because under the terms of the 1956 Consent Decree that was in effect at the
time, the Bell System was prohibited from offering non common carrier communication
services).
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phone companies would leverage their monopoly power to discriminate against
rival providers of data services and increase rates for consumers." Thus, while
local telecommunications providers could offer data processing services
through separate affiliates, AT&T was prohibited from offering data process-
ing services, even through an affiliate. 2
However, the distinction between data processing devices and traditional
telecommunications service proved to be difficult to utilize and apply. 3 As
data processing technologies and telephone services continued to merge
throughout the 1970s and AT&T sought to expand its services offerings to in-
clude data processing, 4 the FCC initiated an inquiry in 1976 to reconsider the
Computer I decision. Four years later, the FCC released the Computer II deci-
sion."
Under Computer II, the Commission allowed the Bell System to operate in
both the growing data telecommunications business and the landline telephone
business, but only through the creation of a different business affiliate. 7 Non-
Bell telephone service providers no longer needed to maintain separate busi-
ness entities to offer data processing services. Furthermore, the FCC rede-
fined computer-based services that utilized a telecommunications connection
as not subject to the common carrier regulatory system of Title ll.8 The Com-
mission distinguished between basic service-regular phone service subject to
Title II-and enhanced communications services-computer-based applica-
tions that utilize the common carrier network not subject to Title ll." The dis-
81 Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L. REv. 273,
311 (2008) [hereinafter Weiser, Next Frontier]; see Harold, supra note 32, at 733.
82 See Weiser, Next Frontier, supra note 81, at 311.
83 See Marks, supra note 80, at 190. The key distinction in the FCC's classification
system was to determine if "the communications component predominates and the data
processing component is incidental thereto," in which case, common carrier regulations
applied, or if the "data processing component predominates and the communications com-
ponent is incidental thereto," in which case the service is left unregulated. Id. at 189.
84 In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Second Computer Inquiry), Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 61 F.C.C.2d 103,
7-9 (July 29, 1976) [hereinafter Computer II Inquiry ]; Computer II Decision, supra note
76, 19-24; see Marks, supra note 80, at 190.
85 See Computer II Inquiry, supra note 84, 7; In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of
the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Computer Inquiry), Supplemental Notice of In-
quiry and Enlargement of Proposed Rulemaking, 64 F.C.C.2d 771, 1-2 (Mar. 1, 1977).
86 Computer I Decision, supra note 76, at 384.
87 See Computer H Decision, supra note 76, 229; Marks, supra note 80, at 191; see
also ZARKIN & ZARKrN, REGULATION WARS, supra note 57, at 70-71.
88 Marks, supra note 80, at 191.
89 Speta, Internet Time, supra note 76, at 1083.
90 Marks, supra note 80, at 191. Enhanced communications services are defined as
services, offered over common carrier transmission facilities used in interstate commu-
nications, which employ computer processing applications that [i] act on the format,
content, code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information;
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tinction allowed the FCC to encourage competition in the enhanced communi-
cations service market by mandating interconnection principles to prevent the
local phone companies that controlled the networks from gaining a competitive
advantage over enhanced service providers. 9'
While the Computer Inquiries were ongoing, the Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit overturned the FCC's decision to prohibit MCI from offering its
Execunet service,9' a long-distance telephone service provided via microwave
technology. 93 The court found that because "the FCC had never ruled in any
formal proceeding that a monopoly in long distance telephony was in the pub-
lic interest, it could not simply restrict competition without a more systematic
justification."'94 The Commission discovered it could not justify its protection
of AT&T's monopoly control over telephone service, setting the stage for the
1982 Modification of Final Judgment ("MFJ") that resulted in the FCC finally
giving up the ghost of the natural monopoly regulatory protection.95
[ii] provide the subscriber additional, different, or restructured information; or [iii] in-
volve subscriber interaction with stored information.
47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (2008).
91 See Werbach, Digital Tornado, supra note 9, at 31-32; Harold, supra note 32, at 734.
Accordingly, the Computer II regime has required all carriers owning common carrier
transmission facilities and providing enhanced services to (1) "unbundle" the basic
from the enhanced components of their services, and (2) offer the unbundled transmis-
sion capacity to other enhanced service providers on the same tariffed terms and condi-
tions through which they provided that capacity to their own enhanced service opera-
tions.
Id. Computer II also mandated that common carrier service providers could not withhold
technical specifications regarding interconnection from non-affiliated enhanced service
providers. Marks, supra note 80, at 191.
92 MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also MCI
Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Speta, Thinkable Reform,
supra note 2, at 201 ("In the famous Execunet decisions, the D.C. Circuit forced the FCC to
justify its restrictions on MCI's provision of basic long-distance services, which led, in due
course, to the opening of those markets."); Speta, Internet Time, supra note 76, at 1085-86.
At issue was MCI's attempt to provide regular long-distance services by combining
certain retail services it purchased from AT&T with its own long-distance networks.
... But after MCI demonstrated that it was technically feasible, the courts forced the
agency to supply a reason-and, importantly, a reason grounded in economics-that
MCI should not then have been permitted to provide these services."
Id.
93 MCI Telecomm. Corp., 561 F.2d at 367-68 & n.3; see ZARKIN & ZARKIN, REGULA-
TION WARS, supra note 57, at 64.
94 ZARKfN & ZARKIN, REGULATION WARS, supra note 57, at 64.; see MCI Telecomm.
Corp., 561 F.2d at 379-80; see also Byrnes, Something New, supra note 27, at 40 ("Bell was
unable to respond to MCI's challenge by citing any authority for its claim of a dejure inter-
state monopoly.").
95 Marks, supra note 80, at 191 (noting that the FCC "ignored the limitations of the
1956 Consent Decree" which prohibited AT&T from providing certain services, and "[t]he
FCC clearly contemplated that the Bell System would offer unregulated CPE and enhanced
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The MFJ, which broke up AT&T into a long-distance service provider and
seven Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs") responsible for local
telephone service, was the death knell of the previous regulatory philosophy of
common carriers.96 The RBOCs were prohibited from offering information
services or long distance services and were also forced to provide access to
their networks without discrimination.97 The restrictions were imposed on the
RBOCs because they "possess[ed] bottleneck control over the local exchange
facilities, and these are the facilities upon which competitive information pro-
viders, like the Regional Companies' competitors in the interexchange and the
manufacturing markets, depend."98 Ironically, the same rationale of "productive
efficiency" that led the federal government to sanction AT&T's natural mo-
nopoly for fifty years was used to justify its breakup.99 While AT&T was being
dismantled, the nascent cable television industry continued to expand, garner-
ing increased regulatory attention.' However, before turning its focus on the
able television industry, the FCC had to determine how the MFJ affected the
Computer Inquiry rules applied to the newly divested AT&T and the RBOCs.
In 1985, the Commission began the Computer III inquiry.'' In the proposed
rules, the FCC determined that if RBOCs complied with an Open Network
services."). The tension between the Commission's action and the 1956 Consent Decree
became moot with the 1982 MFJ. See id. at 191-92.
96 See Robert B. Friedrich, Regulatory and Antitrust Implications of Emerging Competi-
tion in Local Access Telecommunications: How Congress and the FCC Can Encourage
Competition and Technological Progress in Telecommunications, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 646,
658-59 (1995) (describing the MFJ as "accomplish[ing] precisely what [earlier efforts] had
failed to do--impose structural changes in the Bell System that impaired AT&T's ability to
stifle competition").
97 United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 227-28 (1982); see Thomas G. Krat-
tenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 123, 137 (1996) (ex-
plaining under the logic of the MFJ, "AT&T's power came from the [Local Exchange Car-
riers/R]BOCs; now that the [R]BOCs were divorced from AT&T, AT&T could not find its
old predatory tactics profitable, but the [R]BOCs might adopt those tactics for the same
reasons (and with the same successes) as had AT&T.").
98 United States v. W. Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 564 (D.D.C. 1987); see also Kratten-
maker, supra note 97, at 137.
The consent decree (or modification of final judgment or "MFJ") rested on the premise
that the Bell System had used the power of its monopoly local exchange carriers
("LECs") to gain power in markets that could have been competitive, such as providing
long distance services or manufacturing phones, switches, and wires.
Id. (citations omitted).
99 See Nelson, supra note 74, at 2.
1o See ZARKIN & ZARKIN, REGULATION WARS, supra note 57, at 65-66, 87-91 (discuss-
ing the fall of AT&T and the rise of cable and the early regulations on it).
101 In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Third Computer Inquiry), Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 50 Fed. Reg. 33,581 (Aug. 20,
1985).
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Architecture °2 and comparably efficient interconnection standards, they could
offer information services.' °3 The Commission retains the distinction between
information services and basic telephone service today."
As cable television technology rolled out in the 1970s, the general consensus
considered the service a natural monopoly, prompting regulators and legisla-
tors to attempt to shoehorn it into the existing common carrier regulatory struc-
ture.0 5 In 1970, the Commission determined that telephone service providers
were prohibited from offering video services. 6 The Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984 ("Cable Act of 1984") continued this ban on local phone
companies providing video service and allowed the FCC to preempt regula-
tions imposed by local franchising authorities if the cable television operator
faced "effective competition."'07 Under this law, however, cable companies
often became de facto monopolies with exclusive franchise agreements to pro-
vide video service in a particular market.' 0 Despite having control over the
franchise agreements, the local franchising authorities were limited in their
regulatory powers by the Cable Act of 1984.09 This lack of local authority and
102 "Open Network Architecture is supposed to unbundle the various features available
over telephone lines, in theory providing independent information service providers with
more complete information about network features and allowing them to pick and choose
the specific features they need." United States v. W. Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308, 319
(D.D.C. 1991).
103 Harold, supra note 32, at 733 n.53 (citing In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry); and Policy and Rules Con-
cerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations
Thereof; Communications Protocols under Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations, Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (May 15, 1986)).
104 See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 975-
77 (2005) (describing the distinction between telecommunications service, the "analog to
basic service," and information services); see also 47 U.S.C. § 151(20), (46) (2000).
105 See Speta, Internet Time, supra note 76, at 1089; see also Jonathan E. Samon, Com-
ment, When "Yes" Means No: The Subjugation of Competition and Consumer Choice by
Exclusive Municipal Cable Franchises, 34 SEToN HALL L. REV. 747, 747-48 (2004).
106 See Speta, Internet Time, supra note 76, at 1090 (In re Applications of Telephone
Companies for Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facilities Furnished to Affiliated Com-
munity Antenna Television Systems, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 746,
752 (Apr. 22, 1970)).
107 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549 sec. 2, § 623, 98 Stat.
2779, 2788 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543).
108 See Speta, Internet Time, supra note 76, at 1089-90.
109 See id. (noting that local franchising authorities had limited ability to deny a cable
operator's request for renewal and that the Cable Act of 1984 established a ceiling of five
percent of a cable operator's revenues for the local franchise fee); CONSUMER FEDERATION
OF AMERICA & CONSUMERS UNION, LESSONS FROM 1996 TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT: DE-
REGULATION BEFORE MEANINGFUL COMPETITION SPELLS CONSUMER DISASTER 8 (2000)
[hereinafter CONSUMER DISASTER] (noting that the Cable Act of 1984 abolished the ability
of local authorities to impose customer price increase caps).
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the monopolistic power of the cable operators led to rising cable prices" ° and
consumer complaints."'
In response to growing complaints and lack of competition, Congress en-
acted the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
("1992 Cable Act")."2 The legislation sought to foster more competition in the
cable industry"3 and achieve a greater diversity of viewpoints,"4 while subject-
ing basic cable services to enhanced regulation by the FCC, state governments,
and local municipalities." 5 The 1992 Cable Act continued the prohibition of
rate regulation if the cable system had effective competition, but provided ad-
ditional tests to determine whether or not effective competition was present in
a given market."6 Additionally, the 1992 Cable Act prohibited exclusive fran-
chise agreements in order to prevent cable companies from exercising monop-
oly power."7 This began the deregulatory trend that continued with the 1996
Telecommunications Act.
C. The 1996 Telecomcommuications Act and the Internet Age
The passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Telecom Act")
110 CONSUMER DISASTER, supra note 109, at 8 ("Once rates were completely deregulated
they sky rocketed. Between 1986 and 1993, cable rates increased by 71 percent, approxi-
mately 2.5 times the rate of inflation.").
"I Johnson, supra note 49, at 127-28 & n.240 ("The cross-ownership restrictions and
the practice of granting exclusive franchise licenses effectively left the cable industry with-
out competition, much in the same way as the telephone industry. Left unregulated and
without competition, the cable industry eventually employed some of the same anti-
competitive practices that the telephone companies used.").
112 See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 1460, 1460-63 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 47 U.S.C.).
113 Id. § 2(b)(1), (2), (4); see Cooper & Koukoutchos, supra note 24, at 365 ("The 1992
Cable Act amendments were intended to remove the barriers to entry into the MVPD mar-
ket, but, as the market-concentration statistics ... reveal, that legislation has yet to generate
much improvement.").
114 In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Cor-
poration for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications; Broadband Industry Practices;
Petition of Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet Application
Violates the FCC's Internet Policy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for "Rea-
sonable Network Management," Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028,
21 (Aug. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Comcast Order] ("Indeed, in amending Title VI, Congress
recognized the substantial governmental and First Amendment interest in promoting a di-
versity of views provided through multiple technology media.")
115 See Robert W. Crandall, J. Gregory Sidak & Hal J. Singer, Does Video Delivered
Over a Telephone Network Require A Cable Franchise, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 251, 272
(2007).
116 See Alexander C. Larson, An Economic Guide to Competitive Standards in Telecom-
munications Regulation, 1 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 31, 42 (1993).
117 Crandall, Sidak & Singer, supra note 115, at 272.
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marked the first substantial update of the country's communications policy in
sixty years." 8 Congress's intent in passing the 1996 Telecom Act was to put in
place a regulatory structure that shifted away from the viewpoint of communi-
cations as a natural monopoly market to a view of market-based competition
and deregulation." 9 This altered the regulatory scheme that had been in opera-
tion since the nineteenth century.'2 ° Specifically, Congress wanted to encourage
RBOCs and long-distance telephone service providers to compete against one
another. 2' In this respect, the 1996 Telecom Act codified the ruling in United
States v. Western Electric Company, Inc., where Judge Greene of the District
Court for the D.C. Circuit reluctantly removed the restriction preventing the
RBOCs from engaging in the information services business.' 2 Furthermore, the
1996 Telecom Act marked the formal legislative embrace of the principle of
regulatory forbearance.'23 Regarding cable television, the 1996 Telecom Act
removed the restrictions on local telephone companies from providing video
services and implemented a sunset provision on cable television rate regulation
with the exception of the basic tier of channels.'24 With broadcast media, the
1996 Telecom Act repealed the cross-ownership rules between telephone and
cable providers as well as those between cable providers and broadcasters.' It
also removed the remaining regulatory limits on cross ownership between ca-
ble systems and network broadcast stations and increased the percentage of
118 Daniel E. Troy, Advice to the New President on the FCC and Communications Pol-
icy, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 503, 503 (2001).
"19 See JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERI-
CAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 69-71 (2005). Congress withdrew
approval of the RBOC's monopolies through the 1996 Telecom Act, which "fundamentally
restructure[d] local telephone markets" and "subject[ed] [RBOCs] to a host of duties in-
tended to facilitate market entry." AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371
(1999).
120 AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 402 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Since Alexander Graham
Bell invented the telephone in 1876, the States have been, for all practical purposes, exclu-
sively responsible for regulating intrastate telephone service .... [T]he Telecommunications
Act of 1996 altered that more than century-old tradition .... ").
121 Joseph D. Kearney, From the Fall of the Bell System to the Telecommunications Act:
Regulation of Telecommunications under Judge Greene, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1395, 1457-59
(1999).
122 United States v. W. Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308, 333 (D.D.C. 1991).
123 See ZARK1N & ZARKIN, REGULATION WARS, supra note 57, at 9 (noting that section 10
of the 1996 Telecom Act "specifies that the FCC shall forebear from applying any regula-
tion or any provision of this Act if it determines that it is not necessary to ensure that the
charges and practices of telecommunications carriers are just and reasonable, protect con-
sumers, or otherwise serve the public interest.").
124 47 U.S.C. § 543(c)(4), 571; Crandall, Sidak & Singer, supra note 115, at 274.
125 Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1033 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 9, 2002); see
also Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, §§ 202(i), 302(b)(1), 110 Stat.
56, 12, 118.
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households an individual broadcaster can reach with its programming."'
Criticism of the 1996 Telecom Act was almost immediate.'27 New market
entrants needed a base level of competition in the market to help overcome
incumbent providers' monopolistic market power.'28 The industry argued that
service providers did not have an opportunity to bring offerings in the new de-
regulated market before litigation ensued and that the FCC began to implement
the 1996 Telecom Act in a way that ran counter to the policy of promoting
competition at the heart of the 1996 Telecom Act. 29 Furthermore, while the
Internet had made its commercial entry into the American marketplace by
1996, the drafters of the legislation did not foresee the massive upheaval and
restructuring of the telecommunications marketplace that would soon ensue
with the wide scale adoption and use of the Internet.'3° Due to this lack of fore-
sight regarding the Internet, the Commission and its outdated regulatory model
struggles to address the converged nature of the communications industry to-
day. "' The Commission's decision-making regarding Voice over Internet Pro-
tocol ("VolP") services" provides the best example of the Commission's dif-
126 Fox Television Stations, 280 F,3d at 1033; Telecommunications Act of 1996, §
202(c)(1)(B), (f)(1).
127 E.g., Mark Landler, After a Year of Law, Scant Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,
1996, at DI ("Since the Telecommunications Act of 1996 became law, the cable television
industry has largely abandoned its foray into the telephone business. The regional phone
companies have shelved their efforts to get into television. And the three big long-distance
carriers have put through their steepest rate increases in several years.").
128 See CONSUMER DISASTER, supra note 109, at 1-2; George S. Ford & Lawrence J.
Spiwak, Set It and Forget It? Market Power and the Consequences of Premature Deregula-
tion in Telecommunications Markets, I N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 675, 676-80 (2005)
("[D]eregulation is appropriate only when competitive entry is sufficient to substantially
attenuate the exercise of market power by incumbent firms."). But see Byrnes, Something
New, supra note 27, at 103 (arguing that the short term effect of the deregulation is insig-
nificant as compared to the long term lasting effects).
129 Seth Schiesel, All Too Soon, New F.C.C. Chief Finds Warm Welcome is Cooling,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1998, at Dl ("The telecom act never made it to the consumer.... [It]
went from an agreement by the industry participants, to national legislation, to regulation to
litigation. And never once did it stop off in the market to get tested." (quoting Michael Arm-
strong, AT&T's former chairman)). Furthermore, Rep. John Dingell, from Michigan, stated,
"The implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act is a shambles.... The commis-
sion has chosen to not only perpetuate but actually increase bureaucracy in virtually every
area the Congress had intended to eliminate it." Id.
130 See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 119, at 69. In fact, Congress directed the
FCC to adopt a hands-off approach regarding regulation of the Internet; see Duffy, supra
note 35, at 1072 ("[A] policy barring the Commission from assuming substantial regulatory
control over the internet was included in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 .... ").
13 Roberts, supra note 3, at 149 ("Indeed, since the 1996 Act was developed by House
and Senate committees in 1994 and 1995, it almost completely failed to anticipate the Inter-
net and the impact that Internet-based telecommunications services would have on this
complex web of technological and industrial development.").
132 According to the FCC, VolP is a "technology that allows you to make voice calls
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ficulties with addressing a new technology that does not fit the existing regula-
tory paradigm.
The FCC's regulatory actions regarding VoIP have been marked by a sense
of concern that the roots of its regulatory structure are indeed being threat-
ened.'33 Trying to fit technologies like VoIP into the traditional regulatory
structures-Title I or Title II-has numerous policy implications. For instance,
VoIP providers have a possible cost advantage depending on whether the ser-
vice is classified as an Internet information service regulated at the national
level or as a telecommunications service regulated by state and local govern-
ments.3'
After initiating a rulemaking in 2004 to determine if interconnected VolP
services would fall under Title II's common carrier regulatory structure or Title
I's ancillary jurisdiction structure,'35 the FCC has since preempted state regula-
tion of interconnected VolP' 36 and subjected interconnected VolP providers to
the E911 rules,' the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act,'38
contribution to the Universal Service Fund,' relay services for individuals
using a broadband Internet connection instead of a regular (or analog) phone line." FCC,
Voice over Internet Protocol, http://www.fcc.gov/voip/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
133 See Tritt, supra note 21, at 153-54 (describing the disjointed regulatory approach the
FCC has taken with VoIP, imposing some Title II requirements of traditional common carri-
ers, but not others).
134 Speta, Internet Time, supra note 76, at 1141-48 (using VoIP service as a case study
for the challenges to the existing regulatory framework that new communications services
pose for the FCC).
135 See In re IP-Enabled Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 F.C.C.R. 4863,
23-27, 43 (Feb. 12, 2004).
136 See In re Vonage Holdings Corporation Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning
an Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
19 F.C.C.R. 22,404, 1 (Nov. 9, 2004). Interconnected VoIP provides are those with "the
ability of the end user generally to receive calls from and terminate calls to the public
switched telephone network ... including commercial mobile radio service ... networks."
In re IP-Enabled Services; E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Service Providers, First Re-
port and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 10,245, I (May 19,
2005) [hereinafter VoIP E911 Order].
137 VoIPE911 Order, supra note 136, 1.
138 In re Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access
and Services, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20
F.C.C.R. 14,989, 1 (Aug. 5, 2005).
139 In re Universal Service Contribution Methodology; Federal-State Joint Board on
Universal Service; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Streamlined Contributor Reporting
Requirements Associated with Administration of Telecommunications Relay Service, North
American Numbering Plan, Local Number Portability, and Universal Service Support
Mechanisms; Telecommunications Services for Individuals with Hearing and Speech Dis-
abilities, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990; Administration of the North
American Numbering Plan and North American Numbering Plan Cost Recovery Contribu-
tion Factor and Fund Size; Number Resource Optimization; Telephone Number Portability;
Truth-in-Billing and Billing Format; IP-Enabled Services, Report and Order and Notice of
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with disabilities, 4 ' and yearly regulatory fees. 4' The FCC's continued refusal
to classify interconnected VoIP as a telecommunications service or an informa-
tion service illustrates that the Commission's existing regulatory frameworks
fail to address communications technology today. With a basic understanding
of the history of the regulatory scheme governing the communications indus-
try, the current market structure and regulatory model can be examined.
III. THE FCC IN 2009: STRUCTURE AND REGULATORY MODELS
A. Current Structure
The FCC's regulatory jurisdiction remains guided by the 1934 Act. Under
Title 11 of the 1934 Act, the FCC regulates common carriers, primarily tradi-
tional landline telephone service and to a lesser extent wireless services. 42 Un-
der Title III of the 1934 Act, the FCC has regulatory jurisdiction over radio and
wireless services, including radio, television, and satellite operators.' 43 Finally,
under Title VI, the FCC has regulatory authority over cable television.'
44
Additionally, under Title I of the 1934 Act, the FCC has ancillary jurisdic-
tion over information services, including cable modem service and Digital
Subscriber Line ("DSL") service. 45 Ancillary jurisdiction entered the FCC
Proposed Rulemaking, 21 F.C.C.R. 7518, 2 (June 21, 2006).
140 In re IP-Enabled Services; Implementation of Section 255 and 251(a)(2) of the
Communications Act of 1934, as Enacted by the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Access
to Telecommunications Service, Telecommunications Equipment and Customer Premises
Equipment by Persons with Disabilities; Telecommunications Relay Services and Speech-
to-Speech Services for Individuals with Hearing and Speech Disabilities; The Use of N 1I
Codes and Other Abbreviated Dialing Arrangements, Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.R.
11,275, 1 (May 31, 2007).
141 In re Assessment and Collection of Regulatory Fees for Fiscal Year 2007, Report and
Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,712, 2 (Aug. 2, 2007).
142 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151,201 (2000).
143 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-03; see also ZARKIN & ZARKIN, REGULATION WARS, supra note 57,
at 13.
144 See 47 U.S.C. § 521.
145 Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 977-78,
1000 (2005) (upholding the FCC's decision to classify cable modem service as an informa-
tion service thereby shifting it from a regulated common carrier service under Title II, to a
largely unregulated service under Title I); see In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband
Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities; Universal Service Obligations of Broadband
Providers, Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecom-
munications Services; Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company
Provision of Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of Computer
III and ONA Safeguards and Requirements; Conditional Petition of the Verizon Telephone
Companies for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) with Regard to Broadband Services
Provided via Fiber to the Premises; Petition of the Verizon Telephone Companies for De-
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lexicon in 1968 when Midwest Television, a cable television provider, unsuc-
cessfully challenged the FCC's authority to regulate cable television."4 Hold-
ing that the Commission had sufficient authority under Title I, the Supreme
Court rationalized that the FCC's authority is "reasonably ancillary to the ef-
fective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regu-
lation of television broadcasting."'47
The FCC organized itself around different sectors and technologies of the
telecommunications industry, and the differences in these disparate sectors and
technologies often led to different forms of regulation."8 Section 5 of the 1934
Act created a structure of bureaus that reflected the FCC's "principle work
load operations."'49 Until 1949, the FCC organized itself by profession: ac-
countants, engineers, and lawyers each had their own separate offices. 5 ° Be-
cause those professional offices examined policy issues differently, the Com-
mission found it difficult to reach a consensus internally, and decided to reor-
ganize staff into bureaus that are today delineated by the major sectors of the
communications industry. 5 ' The FCC's bureau system in 2009 largely reflects
this sector-based idea of regulation,'52 with the International, Media (broad-
cast), Wireless Telecommunications, Homeland Security, and Wireline Com-
petition (traditional common carrier) Bureaus.'53
claratory Ruling or, Alternatively, for Interim Waiver with Regard to Broadband Services
Provided via Fiber to the Premises; Consumer Protection in the Broadband Era, Report and
Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853, 5 (Aug. 5, 2005) (reclas-
sifying "facilities-based wireline broadband Internet access service" as "information ser-
vice").
146 United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 159-61 (1968).
147 See id. at 178.
148 See ZARKIN & ZARKIN, REGULATION WARS, supra note 57, at xv (noting that even at
the formation of the FCC, the communications industry was not a "single, unified industry,
but rather a series of 'niches' organized around different technologies," each necessitating
different regulatory schemes); see NAPOLI, supra note 21, at 1-2 (discussing the regulation
of communications in the United States as "technologically particularistic," meaning that
regulators devise policy on a particular technology's characteristics).
W9 ZARKIN & ZARKIN, supra note 57, at 9.
150 Id. at 31.
151 Id. For instance, the Wireline Competition Bureau oversees the traditional landline
telephone services, while the Media Bureau oversees the broadcast industry. Wireline Com-
petition Bureau, http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2009); Media Bureau,
http://www.fcc.gov/mb/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
152 ZARKIN & ZARKIN, supra note 57, at 31 ("A major component of the bureau system of
organization today is the maintenance of a bureau for each main sector of the telecommuni-
cations industry.").
'53 FCC, http://www.fcc.gov (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). The Commission has other,
non-sector based bureaus as well, including Consumer & Governmental Affairs, Enforce-
ment, and Public Safety & Homeland Security. Congress has made periodic efforts to force
a reorganization of the FCC. See, e.g., FCC Reorganization Act, H.R. 2982, 109th Cong. §§
2, 3 (2005) (directing the FCC to establish the following bureaus: Spectrum Management,
20091
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
B. The Importance of Regulatory Models and Public Policies
As digital convergence continues to accelerate, understanding the need for
FCC reform requires an analysis of the regulatory models utilized by the
Commission. The impact of these regulatory models as they apply to specific
technologies is made clear by Kevin Werbach, who wrote in the context of the
debate of the Communications Decency Act, "[b]ecause telephone carriers are
generally not legally responsible for the content routed over their networks, but
broadcasters may be subject to fines for transmitting inappropriate material, the
choice of analogy can predetermine the legal outcome."' 54 In other words, the
classification of a communications service into a particular regulatory model
dictates the obligations and regulations a given service provider will face: from
the broadcast model's localism and diversity requirements to the common car-
rier model's interconnection requirements. Furthermore, those stakeholders
who seek to influence the Commission's decision-making frame their desired
outcomes under the policy justifications of the FCC's regulatory models.'55
The theory underlying the Commission's regulatory models has been an ex-
change between the FCC and the particular industry sectors: what can the
Commission receive in return for granting monopoly status (telephone, satel-
lite, telegraph), allowing licensees to use the public airwaves and spectrum
(broadcast radio and television),'56 or allowing services with a sufficient impact
on the Commission's statutory jurisdiction (cable television). From this regula-
tory exchange, different policy goals emerged that the FCC was able to extract:
localism; diversity and competition; and universal service, interconnection, and
Government Affairs and Consumer Education, Economic Regulations, Public Interest,
Broadcast Content, Licensing, Enforcement, and International).
154 Werbach, supra note 9, at 13.
155 NAPOLI, supra note 21, at 250 ("Thus, each stakeholder in the process typically at-
tempts to cloak its interests in the guise of the broader public interest (and its subcompo-
nents). As a result, the foundation principles are used to justify a range of different, and
possibly contradictory, policy options and strategies.").
156 Hirrel, supra note 53, at 124 (arguing that the FCC originally was "expected to, and
did, balance private interests solely against the public interest" compared to today, where
"we think of the FCC largely as an arbiter of competing private interests."). This conceptual
shift is indicative of the FCC's embrace of deregulation and competition in the marketplace.
Contra Byrnes, Something New, supra note 27, at 36 (arguing that "[t]he notion that the
regulatory scheme was merely a price paid in exchange for grant of monopoly status was
historically false" since "[t]he regulatory scheme was initially adopted with respect to other
industries in which there was substantially more competition than in the Vail era of tele-
phone monopoly."). While this may be true, by 1910, Theodore Vail, then chairman of
AT&T, said, "If there is to be state control and regulation, there should also be state protec-
tion-protection to a corporation striving to serve the whole community ... from aggressive
competition which covers only that part which is profitable." GERALD W. BROCK, THE TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: THE DYNAMICS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 103, 159 (1981).
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rate regulation.'57 This exchange is still present in the FCC's operations today,
even as the Commission's stated goals are now deregulation and competition,
and the FCC no longer grants protection of natural monopolies. The specific
regulatory models are described in turn below.
C. The Commission's Regulatory Models
The FCC currently uses five regulatory models: (1) the no-regulation model
for print medium; (2) the common carrier model for telegraph and telephone
services, and to some extent wireless voice services; 58 (3) the public trustee
model for broadcast services, including radio and television; (4) the cable
model for cable television, which is a combination of the common carrier and
public trustee models;'59 and (5) the Internet and information services model.'6 °
1. No-Regulation Model
The Commission does not regulate the newspaper industry; any such at-
tempts would most likely be struck down as violative of the First Amend-
ment's guarantee of freedom of the press. 6 ' One commentator noted, "the print
media enjoys almost complete freedom from government regulation. A pri-
vately owned newspaper can 'advance its own political, social, and economic
views' as long as it has the economic support of advertisers to enable it to con-
tinue operation and 'the journalistic integrity of its editors and publishers."" 62
Most modes of the distribution of information, however, are subject to FCC
157 NAPOLI, supra note 21, at 22.
158 The Commission considers Commercial Mobile Radio Service ("CMRS") providers
to be common carriers and, accordingly, imposes some aspects of Title II's common carrier
regulations on the wireless service providers. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1) (2000).
159 NAPOLI, supra note 21, at 2 (citing P.M. GARRY, SCRAMBLING FOR PROTECTION: THE
NEW MEDIA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1994)).
160 See NAPOLI, supra note 2 1, at 2; ESBIN, SCALPEL OR STEAMROLLER, supra note 21, at
5.
161 See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating a
state statute that required newspapers to provide the opportunity for public officials to re-
spond to personal attacks on the grounds that it was violative of the First Amendment; John
W. Berresford, The Future of the FCC: Promote Competition, Then Relax, 50 ADMIN. L.
REv. 731, 751 (1998) (noting that "[u]nder different rationales over the years, the Commis-
sion has imposed requirements that, if imposed by Congress on books and newspapers,
would be laughed out of any court as an unconstitutional restraint on Freedom of the
Press.").
162 Aarons, supra note 38, at 327 (quoting CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 117 (1973); see also Krattenmaker, supra note 97, at 124 ("No other medium of com-
munication in this country is regulated in this fashion [like the telecommunications indus-
try]; we have no Federal Computer Commission or Federal Newspaper Commission, no
Federal Internet Agency or National Institute of Theatrical Productions.").
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oversight, so long as they are transmitted electronically over wire or through
the airwaves.'63
2. Common Carrier Regulatory Model
The need for interconnection and non-discrimination in the telephone net-
work led to the regulation of service price points and the encouragement of
widespread deployment."6 As AT&T became a monopolist in the provision of
telephone service, 6 ' protection of its natural monopoly in the name of the pub-
lic interest became the justification for the regulatory model.'66 The common
carrier regulatory framework took shape in the form of: (a) price controls;'67 (b)
interconnection requirements;'68 (c) prohibition against provider control of the
content of the communications;'69 and (d) regulation of entry and exit from the
interstate communications market. 7 ° The underlying goal of this framework
was to achieve universal access to telecommunications; a goal that previously
was achieved through cross subsidization by AT&T, and is now largely sus-
tained through subsidies provided through the Universal Service Fund.' This
163 See 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2000).
164 See Roberts, supra note 3, at 152.
165 See id. at 150 n.28 ("In sum, the Bell System served over 80% of U.S. telephone cus-
tomers.")
166 See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 776 (2000).
AT&T's case against divestiture was straightforward: true, AT&T is not faced with ri-
valry as a telephone carrier because its markets are natural monopolies. Scale econo-
mies limit entry; there are no artificial barriers .... Antitrust intervention would be not
just superfluous but disruptive. The real test of the public interest is service quality and
customer satisfaction. The U.S. has both the best and the least expensive phone service
in the world.
Id.
167 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-09.
168 The 1934 Act "did not... mandate broad rights of interconnection (even though that
issue had been at the center of the government's first of three major antitrust actions against
AT&T during the [twentieth] century." Harold, supra note 32, at 731. However, the 1996
Telecom Act added this obligation for common carriers. 47 U.S.C. § 251.
169 See Harold, supra note 32, at 730-31 (noting that a common feature shared by tele-
phone systems and railroads was the perception of those networks as mere "passive carriers
of traffic" that were "neutral conduit[s] to all users"; accordingly the telephone and railroad
networks were prohibited from discrimination regarding the content traveling over the net-
works).
170 Joseph D. Kearney, Will the FCC Go the Way of the ICC?, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1153,
1170-71 (2000) [hereinafter Kearney, FCC Go the Way] (noting that the Commission has
statutory authority to regulate entry and exit from the interstate communications market, but
the FCC has chosen not to exercise that power in any meaningful way since the Execunet
decision).
171 See Rural Tel. Coalition v. FCC, 838 F.2d 1307, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (explaining
that the FCC was originally created to make available telecommunications services to all
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model is still imposed on traditional wireline telephone companies as well as
on wireless providers, save for price controls.
3. Spectrum Scarcity and Public Trustee Regulatory Model
The broadcasters' use of the publicly owned spectrum, the scarcity of spec-
trum, the potential for interference, and the ubiquitous nature of the broadcast
medium, justified its regulation.' The public trustee regulatory model had two
main functions governed by the public interest standard. First, spectrum scar-
city and the public trust of using public airwaves for private gain prompted
regulations seeking to encourage diversity and localism on the airwaves, while
also requiring spectrum licensing to control interference.' In addition, con-
cerns about larger corporations having control over many broadcast channels
prompted the first multiple-ownership rules.'74 Second, the ubiquitous and in-
trusive nature of broadcast radio and television prompted the regulation of
broadcast programming content.'75
In summary, the FCC regulates broadcast television and radio with ration-
ales ranging from public trustee obligations, spectrum scarcity concerns, and
the intrusive and ubiquitous nature of the broadcast medium. Through the pub-
lic trustee model of free exclusive use of spectrum in exchange for broadcast-
ing obligations, the FCC imposes public interest obligations on broadcasters,
encourages diversity to foster a marketplace of ideas, and promotes localism
through broadcasts that serve the needs and wants of the local community.'76
From the spectrum scarcity justification, the FCC imposes its licensing struc-
ture on the public airwaves and manages spectrum allocation and assign-
ment.'77 From the perspective of broadcasting's inherent intrusiveness, the FCC
areas of the country at reasonable rates); Kearney, FCC Go the Way, supra note 170, at
1178-79 (discussing the role of cross-subsidies in achieving the goal of universal service);
47 U.S.C. § 254 (mandating the creation of the Universal Service Fund).
172 Read & Weiner, supra note 2, at 294-95; see Harold, supra note 32, at 737.
It is hard to overstate the importance of the broadcast model-the notion of a provider
who chooses what content it transmits over its own facility to a passive audience ....
The FCC ... distinguished between cable operators, who determined the signals they
offered to the public, from common carriers who had no control over the intelligence
they transmitted.
1d; see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-77 (1969) (noting the scarcity
and the potential for interference in broadcast frequencies).
173 See Johnson, supra note 49, at 90, 95-96.
174 See Stephen R. Barnett, Cable Television and Media Concentration, Part I: Control
of Cable Systems by Local Broadcasters, 22 STAN. L. REv. 221, 251-52 (1970).
175 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978).
176 See NAPOLI, supra note 21, at 22 & fig.2.1, 24-27.
177 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-377, 388 (1969); see also FCC
v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 376 & n.1 1(1984).
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justifies its content regulation of obscene and indecent broadcasts through tele-
vision and radio.1
7 8
4. Hybrid of the Common Carrier and Public Trustee Regulatory Model
The hybrid model is best exemplified through the regulation of the cable
television industry. Originally, the Commission appeared to not have the nec-
essary jurisdiction to regulate the cable industry because it did not use spec-
trum as its means of transmission and was not a common carrier. 79 Nonethe-
less, the Commission justified regulation of cable television based on its ancil-
lary jurisdiction in Title I-the regulation of cable television was ancillary to
broadcast regulation. 80 The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the FCC's juris-
diction over cable based on its Title I ancillary jurisdiction. 8' The regulation of
the cable industry mixed the price setting aspect"' and local control aspect of
the common carrier regulatory model with the diversity public policy goal'83
and content regulation of the public trustee regulatory model.'84
5. Internet and Information Services Regulatory Model
Faced with technology utilizing Internet Protocol ("IP"), which allows trans-
mission of content over a variety of networks and devices,'85 the FCC has con-
tinuously deferred the question of whether its regulatory models are outdated;
instead, the Commission has determined that IP-based broadband services are
subject to its Title I ancillary jurisdiction.'86 In doing so, the Commission has
178 John C. Quale & Malcolm J. Tuesley, Space, The Final Frontier-Expanding FCC
Regulation of Indecent Content onto Direct Broadcast Satellite, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 37, 38
(2007).
179 See United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 164 (1968); Quale & Tuesley,
supra note 178, at 38 & n.2 (noting that cable companies do use spectrum, but not to deliver
content to subscribers).
180 Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 178.
181 Id.
182 Krattenmaker, supra note 97, at 135-36; see notes 105-117 and accompanying text.
183 See 47 U.S.C. § 521(2), (4) (2000); see Dan G. Barry, Note, The Effect of Video
Franchising Reform on Net Neutrality: Does the Beginning of IP Convergence Mean Thai It
Is Time for Net Neutrality Regulation?, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 421,
442 (2008).
184 Maurita Coley et al., FCC Content Regulation of Cable Programming, 818 PLI/Pat
377, 379-93 (PLI Order Number 6061, 2005) (discussing cable programming networks'
obligations regarding content, which include voluntary ratings guidelines, indecency agree-
ments with program distributors, and advertising limitations on children's programming).
185 ESBIN, SCALPEL OR STEAMROLLER, supra note 21, at 5.
186 Id. at 4-5. The Supreme Court upheld the Commission's decision to classify cable
modem broadband Internet service as an information service subject to regulation under
Title 1. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 987-88,
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hand-selected the regulatory obligations it imposes on IP-based services."'
With the 1996 Telecom Act's continuation of the division of telecommunica-
tions services into Title II's common carriers and non-Title II information ser-
vices, Congress essentially evaded deciding that difficult question of how the
telecommunications industry should be regulated.'88
These decisions raise the critical question of what ancillary jurisdiction un-
der Title I entails. What is the regulatory model and what are the associated
public policies under the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction? No historical record
exists to look to for guidance. No real legislative guidance exists when com-
pared to Title II, Title III, or Title VI; only post-hoc judicial decisions impose
limits on the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction. The result is that the FCC is regulat-
ing the most important communications technology of the twenty-first century
in an ad-hoc manner, lurching from decision to decision with no legal, regula-
tory, or guiding principles. This approach only perpetuates criticism and must
be modified to ensure the United States remains competitive in the global mar-
ketplace.
IV. WHY REFORM IS NEEDED AND WHAT REFORMS SHOULD BE
ENACTED
A. Survey of Criticisms Leveled Against the FCC
The FCC is the subject of much criticism from different branches of the
government, the communications industry, and public interest groups. A brief
outline of some of the criticism will provide more rationale for the need to re-
form the Commission. Such criticisms inevitably focus on a number of differ-
ent areas, including the FCC's processes, politics, legal decision-making, regu-
latory capture, the FCC's revolving door between government service and pri-
vate sector jobs, and the concentration of power in the Chairman's office.
The FCC, like many administrative agencies, was created so that govern-
ment regulation could take place in a flexible and quick moving setting, allow-
996-97 (2005).
187 See supra notes 133-141 and accompanying text.
188 Wiley, supra note 3, at 23-24.
[E]ven though the [1996 Telecom Act] paid lip service to convergence, it still pre-
sumed that historically distinct market segments would remain separate, operating un-
der their own unique rules even when providing services that compete with one another
.... [T]he Act perpetuated a distinction between "telecommunications services,"
which are subject to traditional common carrier regulation, and "information services,"
which are not so regulated.
Id. (citations omitted).
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ing for adaptation to industry changes.'89 Time and experience, however, have
shown that the FCC has grown to be a cumbersome and slow-moving body. 9 °
Part of the FCC's reputation for glacial-like speeds is the rulemaking process
that the Commission is bound to by the Administrative Procedure Act. 9' In one
notable example, the FCC waited one year to dismiss a one-page petition for
forbearance from tariff regulations by OrbitCom, a competitive telephone ser-
vice provider.'92 Much ink has been spilled lamenting the fourteen-point FCC
checklist that RBOCs must complete before the Commission allows them to
enter the long-distance market.'93 And in what then-Chairman Michael Powell
called an "embarrassment" for the FCC, the Commission took six months after
its vote on the Triennial Review and Media Ownership rulemaking to release
the official decision.'94 Congress, often responding to pressure from industry,
has pushed the FCC to act faster.'95
The FCC, as with all government agencies, even "independent" agencies,
has always been subject to politicization,'96 whether by presidents and congres-
189 See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polariza-
tion and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REv. 459, 463 (2008). Indeed, as one
member of Congress pointed out in the debate over the creation of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, "How much better this [the proposal for an independent commission] is than
to fix in advance by inflexible law the whole body of rules to govern the most complex
business known to our civilization." Id.
190 See Michael Powell, The Great Digital Broadband Migration, in COMMUNICATIONS
DEREGULATION AND FCC REFORM: FINISHING THE JOB 11, 18 (Jeffrey A. Eisenach &
Randolph J. May eds., 2001).
191 See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121
HARV. L. REv. 543, 585-86 (2007); see also Lisa Blumensaadt, Comment, Horizontal and
Conglomerate Merger Conditions: An Interim Regulatory Approach for a Converged Envi-
ronment, 8 COMMLAW CONsPECTUS 291, 292 (2000) (citing Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1999) and 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.399-1.430 (1999)).
192 In re Petition of OrbitCom, Inc. for Forbearance from CLEC Access Charge Rules,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,187, 2 (Aug. 27, 2008) (explaining that
the petition was filed on August 27, 2007, exactly one year before the Commission took
action).
193 Rui J. P. de Figueierdo, Jr. & Pablo T. Spiller, Strategy, Structure and Regulation:
Telecommunications in the New Economy, 2000 L. REv. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 253, 280-81
(2000) ("From the passage of the Telecommunications Act in February 1996, until Decem-
ber 1999, the FCC did not allow any of the RBOCs to enter long distance markets ... ").
194 May, supra note 22, at 1313-14 (citing Powell Sees UNE Order Released This Week,
COMM. DAILY, Aug. 19, 2003).
195 See Protecting Consumers Through Proper Forbearance Procedures Act, H.R. 3914,
11 0th Cong. § 1 (2007). Introduced by Rep. John Dingell, "[tihe bill takes the 'deemed
granted' wording out of the Telecom code and just says that the FCC has to make a decision
in a year, with a ninety day extension if necessary." Matthew Lasar, Bill Would Make It
Harder for Telecoms to Skirt Competition, ARs TECHNICA, July 23, 2008,
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080723-bill-would-make-it-harder-for-telecoms-to-
skirt-competition.html.
196 See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the
Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase 's "Big Joke ": An Essay on
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sional leaders through the appointment process197 or through oversight and
budgetary pressure exerted by Congress.'98 The politicization of the FCC leads
to a greater partisan environment at the Commission,' 99 especially since a deal
President Bill Clinton cut with Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole in 1997,
giving the minority party control over the President's selection of the minority
party's commissioners on the FCC.2"
Phillip Napoli suggests that two unreleased, and subsequently leaked, stud-
ies prepared by the Commission under Chairman Kevin Martin provide evi-
dence that "results-driven policymaking may be operating under the guise of
evidence-driven policy-making, and that policy research was being employed
more for political purposes than for analytical purposes." '' The two studies
questioned the FCC's moves to ease media ownership rules, contrary to
Chairman Martin's preference at the time. 2 Furthermore, when the Commis-
sion ultimately does make decisions, the courts often reverse them.
The FCC has suffered an embarrassing rate of reversal regarding its own de-
cisions and procedures.0 Commentators have suggested a variety of explana-
Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335, 372 (2001) ("Probably no quasi-
judicial body was ever subject to so much Congressional pressure as the Federal Radio
Commission." (quoting LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, THE FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION 55
(1932)); see also Shooshan, supra note 23, at 646 & n.32.
In the 1970s, the Senate Commerce Committee commissioned an analysis of appoint-
ments to the FCC and Federal Trade Commission which found that: Partisan political
considerations dominate the selection of regulators to an alarming extent. Alarming in
that other factors-such as competence, experience, and even, on occasion, regulatory
philosophy-are only secondary considerations.
Id.
197 House Speaker Sam Rayburn said to newly appointed FCC Chairman Newton Mi-
now, "Just remember one thing, son. Your agency is an arm of the Congress; you belong to
us. Remember that and you'll be all right." ZARKrN & ZARKIN, REGULATION WARS, supra
note 57, at 50. Another example is Senators Albert Gore and Daniel Inouye forcing Al
Sikes, Andrew Barrett, and Sherrie Marshall to change their minds on FCC regulation of
indecency in exchange for Senate confirmation. Id. at 50-51.
198 See ZARKIN & ZARKIN, REGULATION WARS, supra note 57, at 51.
199 Devins & Lewis, supra note 189, at 447 (describing the rise of more politicized inde-
pendent agencies beginning under President Reagan and arguing that today's independent
agencies are more subject to Presidential influence than at any other point in history).
200 G. CALVIN MACKENZIE, INNOCENT UNTIL NOMINATED: THE BREAKDOWN OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 33 (2001) (describing the relatively recent tradition
of the President ceding control of the selection of minority-party nominees to the Senate in
exchange for quick and smooth confirmation of the President's party nominees).
201 Philip M. Napoli, Paradoxes of Media Policy Analysis: Implications for Public Inter-
est Media Regulation 9-10 (McGannon Center Working Paper Series, Paper 17, 2008),
available at http://fordham.bepress.com/mcgannon working-papers/l 7 (click "download").
202 See id (explaining the controversy surrounding the studies); Kevin J. Martin, Edito-
rial, The Daily Show, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2007, at A29 (arguing that the FCC should relax
the media cross-ownership rule to save struggling print media, including newspapers).
203 See James B. Speta, FCC Authority to Regulate the Internet: Creating It and Limiting
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tions for this trend, including the ambiguous regulatory principles of the public
interest, a marketplace of ideas, diversity, localism, and competition invoked to
justify FCC policies."° The meaning and import of these principles often shifts
depending on the technology at issue, the prevailing political sentiment at
large, and the ideologies of the sitting FCC commissioners. 5
It is tempting to blame the FCC's Office of General Counsel's Administra-
tive Law Division, which is responsible for approving regulations before en-
actment, or the Litigation Division, which is responsible for defending the
Commission's decisions in the federal courts. 6 Yet, there is no safeguard in
place to prevent the Chairman from directing the approval of a regulation or
order despite the Administrative Law Division's advice to the contrary. To
address this, former Chairman Reed Hundt has proposed making the FCC's
General Counsel certify that any regulation promulgated by the Commission
passes legal muster,"' which requires both substantive legality and compliance
with the Administrative Procedure Act.
20 8
In addition, the FCC's position in these cases often seems driven by a thinly
veiled goal of protecting existing dominant industries from new upstart tech-
nologies. In 1977, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck down the
FCC's cable anti-siphoning rules,2 9 which were enacted to protect the domi-
nant broadcast television industry from the nascent, but growing, cable televi-
sion industry.2' Again concerned that broadcast television would exit the mar-
ketplace, the FCC promulgated the first "must carry" rules to address the prob-
It, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 15, 27 n.65 (2003) [hereinafter Speta, FCC Authority] (citing thir-
teen major court cases starting in 2000 where a court overturned a significant FCC deci-
sion).
204 NAPOLI, supra note 21, at 3-5.
205 See, e.g., id The Commission is specifically susceptible to political influence. Id. at
14 ("The communications industry's unique potential for social and political influence
places communications policymakers in a position to have a powerful indirect effect-via
their policy decisions--on social and political attitudes, beliefs, cognitions, and values.").
206 See ZARKIN & ZARKIN, REGULATION WARS, supra note 57, at 36 (explaining the func-
tion of each of the respective offices). Similarly, the U.S. Solicitor General, responsible for
arguing the position of the federal government in all cases appearing before the Supreme
Court in which the federal government is a party, is not to blame either. Dep't of Justice,
About the Office of the Solicitor General, http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/aboutus.htm (last
visited Mar. 26, 2009).
207 Hundt & Rosston, supra note 12, at 33.
208 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2006).
209 Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Commission's
anti-siphoning rules restricted the quantity of movies and sports programming that could be
shown on cable broadcasting partially because of "the Commission's fear that the revenue
derived from subscription operations would be sufficient to allow subscription operators to
bid away the best programs in these categories, thus reducing the quality of conventional
television." Id. at 21.
210 See ZARKIN & ZARKIN, REGULATION WARS, supra note 57, at 87.
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lem of cable operators from importing distant broadcast signals at the expense
of local broadcasters."' The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck down
the must carry rules as unconstitutional in 1985. '2 Seven years later, Congress
gave its legislative blessing to modified must carry rules.
2
1
3
In another instance, seeking to protect AT&T's monopoly in long-distance
telephone service, the FCC denied MCI's application to launch its Execunet
service, deeming the proposed offering too similar to long-distance telephone
service. ' The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed the FCC's decision, removing
the monopoly protection from AT&T's long distance service.1 5
Alternatively, the FCC sometimes seeks to coddle new technologies or mar-
ket entrants. Following the enactment of the Telecom Act of 1996, the FCC
encouraged Competitive Local Exchange Carriers ("CLECs") to enter the local
telephone service market and compete against Incumbent Local Exchange Car-
riers ("ILECs").2 6 There were two types of CLECs: those that relied almost
exclusively on the incumbent's network and facilities and essentially resold
their offering by using what was called the Unbundled Network Element Plat-
form ("UNE-P"),2 7 and those that were more facilities-based CLECs but
needed access to some incumbent network elements to make their service
work, such as the last mile copper loops.2 8 The FCC's interconnection re-
quirements had the opposite effect, ultimately discouraging both types of
CLECs and ILECs from investing in their networks. The ILECs had no moti-
vation to invest in their networks only to be forced to share the fruits of their
investment with CLECs, and the CLECs did not want to invest in independent
networks because they could instead use the ILECs' networks. 2 9 When the
FCC gave up on the unbundling rules, CLECs focused on more sustainable
211 Id. at 124-25 (noting that the FCC's must carry rules required cable broadcasters to
carry local broadcast television stations).
212 Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1462-63 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
213 See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, § 2(a)(9) 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
214 MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365, 368-69 (D.C. Cir. 1977); ZARKIN &
ZARKIN, REGULATION WARs, supra note 57, at 64.
215 MCI Telecomm. Corp., 561 F.2d at 380; MCI Telecom. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590,
600 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
216 See In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996; Interconnection between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mo-
bile Radio Service Providers, First Report and Order, 1I F.C.C.R. 15,499, 1-3 (Aug. 1,
1996). The Commission adopted the rules under congressional mandate in the 1996 Tele-
com Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3), (d)(l) (2000).
217 See Nelson, supra note 74, at 10.
218 See id; Thomas W. Hazlett, Rivalrous Telecommunications Networks With and With-
out Mandatory Sharing, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 477, 483 (2006) [hereinafter Hazlett, Rivalrous
Telecommunications].
219 Hazlett, Rivalrous Telecommunications, supra note 218, at 479.
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business models and emerging technologies.2"
While the motive of encouraging competition and new entrants in the com-
munications marketplace is laudable, the Commission's actions reinforce the
reality that the FCC has the ability to effectively destroy or promote a particu-
lar company or a business model. Whether one views this as creating regula-
tory arbitrage or not,22' it is implausible to deny that serious political maneuver-
ing at the Commission is an absolutely necessary component of doing business
in the communications industry. The Commission also suffers other ills of ad-
ministrative agencies: the seemingly related problems of regulatory capture
and the "revolving door."
The theory of regulatory capture posits that a regulatory agency, directed to
serve the public interest, instead serves the needs of the industry that the
agency is charged with regulating.2 Particularly before the 1996 Telecom Act,
academics, commentators, and even some FCC Commissioners claimed the
Commission had fallen under the spell of regulatory capture.223
The impact of regulatory capture is exacerbated by the revolving door at the
Commission, where high-level Commission personnel frequently depart gov-
ernment service to work directly for the companies they previously regu-
lated. 24 To address this issue, a former FCC Commissioner has called for
220 See id. at 485-86 (arguing that after the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
FCC's network unbundling rules in 2004, CLECs such as AT&T and MCI ceased local
phone service that utilized unbundled network elements).
22! The Commission defined regulatory arbitrage as "businesses making decisions based
on regulatory classifications rather than on customers' preferences and innovative and sus-
tainable business plans." In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over
Cable and Other Facilities, Internet over Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appropriate Regulatory
Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over Cable Facilities, Declaratory Ruling
and Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 90 (Mar. 14, 2002).
222 Dominique Custos, The Rulemaking Power of Independent Regulatory Agencies, 54
AM. J. COMP. L. 615, 635 (2006). The concept of regulatory capture is broader than simply
doing the bidding of regulated industries. Toni Makkai and John Braithwaite, in studying
the Australian nursing home industry, identified "three empirically distinct forms of capture:
identification with the industry, sympathy with the particular problems that regulated firms
confront in meeting standards, and absence of toughness." Toni Makkai & John Braithwaite,
In and Out of the Revolving Door: Making Sense of Regulatory Capture, 12 J. PUB. POL'Y
61, 61 (1992).
223 See Thomas W. Hazlett, Explaining the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Comment
on Thomas G. Krattenmaker, 29 CoNN. L. REv. 217, 221 (1996) (describing the pre-1996
Telecom Act FCC as a "cartel-enforcement agency, one which could reliably be called on
by incumbents to formulate rules which would make competitive entry economically impos-
sible" and noting then-Chairman Reed Hundt commenting, "[t]hat old paradigm led some to
say with justice that the FCC, as the erstwhile regulator of these monopolies, had come to
stand for Firmly Captured by Corporations.").
224 See Jeffery E. Cohen, The Dynamics of the "Revolving Door" on the FCC, 30 AM. J.
POL. Sci. 689, 690 (1986); Timothy Lee, Revolving Door Undermines FCC's Watchdog
Role, TECHDIRT, Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20080831/0618342133.
html (reporting that Catherine Bohigian, the chief of the FCC's Office of Strategic Planning
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Commissioners to be barred from employment with any industry regulated by
the FCC.2 5 On the other hand, however, recruiting qualified and skilled per-
sonnel for jobs at the Commission could be more difficult with such a restric-
tion in place. Current policy requires a one-year period before high-level offi-
cials can take some industry jobs.26 However, some commentators have criti-
cized the enforcement of these revolving door laws on the grounds the laws are
too complex and too ambiguous, they require unavailable government re-
sources to prosecute violations and evidence supporting such a charge is diffi-
cult to find. 2 ' Adding to the politicization of the Commission-and perhaps
the problem of regulatory capture-is the continued consolidation of power
within the Chairman's office.
The consolidation of power has a direct impact on the Commission's day-to-
day operations. 28 The Commission's handling of the complaint against Corn-
cast for violation of its Internet policies provides a common case study. When
the FCC, by a vote of three-to-two, issued its order on Comcast's network
management practices, the majority, led by then Chairman Martin, worked on
the order without the input of the other commissioners, redrafting the docu-
ment until the evening before the vote and forcing the dissenting commission-
ers to vote on a document they had not fully had time to analyze.
2 9
Earlier this year, Television Week listed some of the operational criticisms of
Chairman Martin's tenure: "[T]he FCC under Mr. Martin has repeatedly issued
major decisions after business hours. It has sometimes started meetings hours
late. It has regularly issued commission orders weeks to months after commis-
sioners supposedly voted on final details, which critics call a strong indication
that the vote wasn't in fact final.""23 With the existing regulatory models and
and Policy Analysis, left that position to take a job with the cable television company Ca-
blevision). But see 18 U.S.C. § 207 (2006) (mandating a one-year cooling-off period for
high level employees).
225 ZARKIN & ZARKIN, REGULATION WARS, supra note 57, at 161-62.
226 See 18 U.S.C. § 207(b) (2006).
227 E.g., PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT, THE POLITICS OF CONTRACTING (2004),
http://www.pogo.org/pogo-files/reports/govemment-corruption/the-politics-of-
contracting/gc-rd-20040629.html.
228 See COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DE-
CEPTION AND DISTRUST: THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION UNDER CHAIRMAN
KEVIN J. MARTIN 2-3 (2008), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/images/stories/
DocumentsiPDF/Newsroom/fcc%20majority%20staff/o20report%20081209.pdf.
229 Comcast Order, supra note 114, at 61 (Comm'r McDowell, dissenting) ("Accord-
ingly, we are compelled by statute to examine the procedural issues before us as well as to
weigh the facts against the current state of the law. Commissioner Tate and I received the
current version of the order at 7 p.m. last night, with about half of its content added or modi-
fied. As a result, even after my office reviewed this new draft into the wee hours of the
morning, I can only render a partial analysis.").
230 Ira Teinowitz, Martin to Leave Mixed Legacy, TV WK., Apr. 14, 2008 at 13. In 2007,
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the most common criticisms of the FCC identified, the possible reforms can
next be examined.
B. Survey of Possible Reforms to the FCC
The Commission should not return to the traditional regulatory models to
deal with the communications industry in the twenty-first century. Comment-
ers and policymakers have crafted numerous reform proposals,23" ' however,
they tend to merely tinker around the edges. 32 John Duffy noted,
[Former FCC Chairman] Newton Minow, for example, came to recognize that "the re-
forms of the 1960s, however just or well intentioned, had done very little to clarify the
meaning and application of the public-interest standard in the Communications Act. In
some respects, they had made matters worse." The fundamental problem, as Minow
perceived, was the public interest standard in the Communications Act, which stands
as a monument to the mistake of writing into law vaguely worded quid pro quos.
2 3
There have been prior calls for the reform of the FCC in light of conver-
gence pressures, even coming from the Commission itself.34 It is useful to
briefly examine some of the suggested possible reforms, including wholesale
elimination of the Commission, streamlining the Commission's bureaucracy,
and procedural reforms.
Robert Bartley and Glen Robinson are two former FCC Commissioners who
have called for an abolishment or radical restructuring of the FCC in light of
the rapid pace of technological change. 3 While there is precedent for the com-
the House Commerce and Energy Committee launched an investigation into the manner that
Martin had run the Commission, and initial reports from the investigation blamed Martin for
his mismanagement. See Cecilia Kang, As Congress Examines FCC, Chairman May Be
Asked to DefendHis Leadership, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2008, at D7.
231 Kearney, FCC Go the Way, supra note 170, at 1191-92 (noting a number of com-
mentators who have proposed abolishing the FCC, including the Heritage Foundation); PE-
TER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC AND LET COMMON LAW
RULE THE TELECOSM 6-9 (1997); GEORGE A. KEYWORTH II, JEFFREY EISENACH, THOMAS
LENARD & DAVID E. COLTON, THE TELECOM REVOLUTION-AN AMERICAN OPPORTUNITY 2-
3 (1995), available at http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/books/0595telecomrevolution.pdf;
Alan Pearce, Telecom Reform on the Money for GOP Backers, NETWORK WORLD, Feb. 20,
1995, at 1, 56 (noting that then-Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich considered abolishing
the FCC).
232 See, e.g., FCC Strategic Plan, supra note 18, at 1-2 (refocusing the current goals of
the FCC); FCC Reorganization Act, H.R. 2982, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005) (reorganizing the
FCC's bureau and office structure).
233 Duffy, supra note 35, at 1121-22 (citations omitted).
234 See, e.g., FCC Strategic Plan, supra note 18, at 3 (arguing that the FCC should be
restructured to focus on "core functions" that include spectrum management, universal ser-
vice, consumer protection, and enforcement of competitive markets).
235 ZARKIN & ZARKIN, REGULATION WARS, supra note 57, at 158, 161-62; Robinson,
FCC 2000, supra note 18, at 155-58.
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plete abolition of regulatory agencies, 236 and in the past fifteen years, commen-
tators and academics have periodically issued calls for the Commission's abo-
lition,237 such a drastic step would ignore both the current political environment
and fail to recognize areas where the FCC can still play an important role.238 A
total abolishment disregards the current political environment; broadband and
communications infrastructure development had a major role in economic
stimulus legislation in the 111 th Congress, 239 and President Barack Obama's
efficiency-enhancing measures appear to be focused on using a scalpel, not a
hatchet in reforming government operations and expenditures. 4°
Numerous commentators have argued that the FCC, as an expansive, inde-
pendent agency with wide-ranging jurisdiction, should be scaled back to only
focus on critical regulatory needs, like interference, international issues, and to
ensure interconnection. 4' Other commentators suggest a single administrator or
commissioner should replace the FCC's current five-member body.24 Martha
Garcia-Murillo and Ian Maclnnes argue that the FCC should be organized not
by traditional industry division, but by function, including rate oversight, uni-
versal service, and spectrum allocation. 43 While an efficient agency structure is
clearly important, its positive impacts will generally be limited to procedural
and process systems, not to the underlying policy positions and regulatory re-
236 Kearney, FCC Go the Way, supra note 170, at 1156, 1191-92 (noting that both the
Civil Aeronautics Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission were abolished).
237 See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
238 Kearney, FCC Go the Way, supra note 170, at 1193 (suggesting that by reinventing
itself, "the FCC would continue to exist and indeed to possess the same formal authority as
previously, but its focus would not be the traditional regulation of entry, rates, and service
that long characterized [it] .... ").
239 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, H.R. 1, § 60010) (2009).
240 See, e.g., Stephanie Condon, GOP, Dems Spar over Broadband "Stimulus" and FCC
Powers, CNET NEWS, Jan, 22, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10148578-
38.html; Russ Britt, McCain Proposes Spending Freeze; Obama Says "Scalpel Is Needed,"
Fox BUSINESS, Sept. 26, 2008, http://www.foxbusiness.com/story/mccain-proposes-
spending-freee-obama-says-scalpel-needed/.
241 Krattenmaker, supra note 97, at 172-73 (arguing that there is simply not a need for a
federal agency with sweeping and broad jurisdiction over the communications industry, and
instead calling for more limited-in size and in scope-federal agencies dedicated to spe-
cific areas, such as a "Federal Spectrum Commission"); see Kearney, FCC Go the Way,
supra note 170, at 1192-93 (discussing a reduction in the scope of the FCC's authority,
where it "would be reduced to situations in which there is some reason to think that reliance
on the market, though desirable, is not feasible.").
242 Shooshan, supra note 23, at 639-40, 651-52 (arguing in favor of a single administra-
tor at the FCC, but recognizing that serious concerns with such a proposal include a less
independent agency, a more corruptible agency, and an administrator more prone to follow-
ing the wishes of the President or Congress); May, supra note 22, at 1321 (arguing that
when reforming the FCC, the option of reducing the number of commissioners or installing
a unitary head must be considered).
243 Martha A. Garcia-Murillo & Ian MacInnes, FCC Organizational Structure and Regu-
latory Convergence, 25 TELECOMM. POL'Y 431, 450-51 (2001).
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gimes the FCC currently operates.
As noted, Rep. Barton's draft bill, "FCC PROCESS" is a step in the direc-
tion of reform of the processes at the FCC. The bill's stated goal is to "improve
public participation and overall decision-making at the [FCC]." 2" While part of
the impetus of the bill could be related to the management style of former
Chairman Kevin Martin,245 the legislation does address concerns regarding the
FCC's bureaucracy. Specifically, the bill proposes, among other things,246 to
allow all members of the FCC enough time to analyze proposed decisions be-
fore a vote,247 while also limiting the amount of time the FCC has in addressing
"petitions, applications, complaints, and other filings seeking Commission ac-
tion.""'
However, while proposing some much-needed reform of FCC processes, the
limited goals of the legislation mean that the bill is just tinkering around the
edges of the greater need for institutional, not merely procedural or managerial,
reform of the Commission. 49 With the shortcomings of the current structure
and operation of the Commission established and various reform proposals
examined, the required areas of reform for the new presidential administration
are illuminated.
V. NECESSARY CONSIDERATIONS OF THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS
While the 1996 Telecomm Act significantly updated the country's commu-
nication regulatory structure, the foundation of that structure remained the
same: the 1934 Communications Act. ° As one commenter noted, "The 1934
244 FCC Procedural Reform for Openness and Clarity Encouraging Sensible Solutions
(FCC PROCESS) Act, H.R., 110th Cong. pmbl. (2008) (draft legislation), available at,
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/file/2304-FCCProceduralReform forOpenness and_
ClarityEncouragingSensibleSolutionsActFCC PROCESS Act .pdf.
245 The management style and the manner in which Chairman Martin ran the FCC was
the focus of criticism from members of Congress and the FCC alike. See, e.g., Jim Puzzang-
hera, Criticism of the FCC's Chairman Is Widely Aired, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2007 at C1;
Jim Puzzanghera, FCC Chairman Target of House Panel's Investigation, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
4, 2007 at C3; Kim Hart, FCC Chairman Draws Fire for Cross-Ownership Plan, WASH.
POST, Dec. 6, 2007 at D3.
246 FCC PROCESS Act, H.R., 1 10th Cong. §3 (providing additional time for the public
to weigh in on changes the FCC is considering regarding draft regulations already circulated
for public comment).
247 FCC PROCESS Act, 110th Cong. sec. 3, § 5B(a)(1)(C), (a)(2).
248 Id. sec. 3, § 5B(a)(3).
249 ESBIN, SCALPEL OR STEAMROLLER, supra note 21, at 5. Esbin provides an excellent
summary of the Barton legislation's shortcoming in terms of institutional reform.
250 Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, supra note 38, at 905-06 ("Despite ambitious rhetoric
regarding the scope of liberalization in telecommunications markets, the omnibus 1996
Telecommunications Act did shockingly little to disturb age-old regulatory arrangements in
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Act was written in such a way that the various categories of the telecommuni-
cations industry were kept in 'silos,' with each category having different fed-
eral rules as well as a mix of federal and state interpretations."25 ' In light of
converged technology and the ills of the current regulatory paradigm at the
FCC, what should be the regulatory framework in a digitalized and converged
communications industry?
A. New Legislation to Update the 1996 Telecom Act
There are a number of principles and specific provisions that should be in-
cluded in any proposed new legislation to update the 1996 Telecom Act. These
principles aim to address the barriers facing the digitalized environment under
the Commission's outdated regulatory models. These principles, or proposals,
include revoking the policy-making authority from the FCC, and increasing the
transparency of the issues over which the Commission has authority. Further-
more, while the FCC should not retain policy-making powers, it should con-
tinue to play the role of adjudicator in several areas including spectrum man-
agement and interconnection.
1. Removal of Policy-making Powers from the FCC
First, reform legislation should take away policy-making powers from the
FCC. The legislative and executive branches should create the nation's com-
munications policy, rather than an independent agency like the FCC.252 Com-
radio and television broadcasting."); Speta, Internet Time, supra note 76, at 1068 (noting
that while the 1996 Telecom Act did ease some roadblocks for competition in the telephone
market, such as "eliminating legal barriers to entry into all telecommunications markets, ...
. [b]ut Congress did nothing further to assist the development of intermodal competition.
Rather, it continued the historic, but increasingly irrelevant, regulatory divisions between
services, based on the technologies used to deliver them.").
251 Nelson, supra note 74, at 6.
252 Scholars and commentators have written extensively on the constitutionality and the
legal limits of delegated authority, independent agencies, and the unitary executive princi-
ple. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy
in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 461, 462-64 (2003) (arguing that recent em-
phasis on political accountability in independent agencies has lead to an unfortunate de-
crease in the focus on arbitrary decision-making by independent agencies); Elena Kagan,
Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245, 2384 (2001) (arguing that greater
presidential control of the administrative states enhances agency effectiveness and account-
ability); Barron, supra note 66, at 1097 (describing centralization and politicization as two
methods by which presidential administrations have achieved greater control over agency
decision-making, and arguing that despite the increased coherence resulting from the greater
presidential control, more emphasis should be placed on involving alternative stakeholders).
These questions of administrative and constitutional law are beyond the scope of this Com-
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munications policy-making should reside in the Commerce Department, which
already houses the National Telecommunications and Information Administra-
tion ("NTIA").2 53 As two commentators explain, citing the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency and the Food and Drug Administration as examples, it is not
necessary to have complex and important policy-making functions reside in
administrative agencies."' Given the increasing importance of the communica-
tions industry in the national economy and spillover effects to other indus-
tries,255 the policy-making functions of the FCC should reside within the execu-
tive branch.
When the FCC chooses to stake out a strong policy position, it often results
in delay, confusion, and politicization. For example, the auction of spectrum
for a nation-wide, interoperable public safety network failed to generate a bid
that met the Commission's reserve price and remains unresolved.256 The auc-
tion of the AWS-3 spectrum-an unpaired slice of spectrum from 2155-2175
MHz for fixed and mobile services-is in a stalemate over concems that the
FCC has tailored the auction rules to one company and business model: M2Z's
plan for a nation-wide free wireless "broadband" service. 27 Policy-making in
ment.
253 See Nat'l Telecomm. & Info. Admin., About the NTIA, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
about.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). The NTIA describes itself as
the President's principal adviser on telecommunications and information policy
issues .... In addition to representing the Executive Branch in both domestic and in-
ternational telecommunications and information policy activities, NTIA also manages
the Federal use of spectrum; performs cutting-edge telecommunications research and
engineering, including resolving technical telecommunications issues for the Federal
government and private sector; and administers infrastructure and public telecommuni-
cations facilities grants.
Id.
254 Devins & Lewis, supra note 189, at 464 (noting that each of these regulatory policy
areas is "delegated to hierarchical executive-branch bureaus").
255 See, e.g., Robert D. Atkinson, Framing a National Broadband Policy, 16 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 145, 154-65 (2007) (discussing the spillover effects broadband policy has on
other industries and the ability of the United States to compete in a global market).
256 Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Delinks 700 MHz Upper D Block
from Other Blocks, Will Release Information on 700 MHz Auction Winning Bidders (Mar.
20, 2008), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-280948A1.pdf, see also
In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands; Implementing a
Nationwide, Broadband Interoperable Public Safety Network in the 700 MHz Band, Third
Further Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 14,301, 1 (Sept. 25, 2008).
257 In re Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services In the 2155-2175 MHz Band;
Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services in the 1915-1920 MHz, 1995-2000 MHz,
2020-2025 MHz and 2175-2180 MHz Bands, Comments of CTIA-The Wireless Associa-
tion, WT Docket Nos. 07-195, 04-356, at 4 (July 25, 2008) [hereinafter AWS Comments of
CTIA] (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System). In exchange for the spec-
trum, M2Z proposed to "make available free, high speed broadband access to nearly every
consumer, business and non-profit and public safety entity in the United States without rely-
ing on the Universal Service Fund or other taxpayer dollars." In re M2Z Networks Inc.,
[Vol. 17
FCC Reform
the executive branch could resolve this issue by allowing for more certainty
and consistency, ensured through increased political accountability for failed
policies.258
As an example of failed policy making with little accountability, in 2000,
Northpoint Technology, Ltd. sought to convince the FCC to put Multichannel
Video Programming Distributor ("MVPD") service offered by that particular
company into spectrum allocated for Direct Broadcast Service ("DBS").259 Be-
cause the Commission wrote the auction rules with this company in mind,
when Northpoint failed to participate in the auction, the spectrum remained
fallow. 2 ° When the FCC moves away from serving as a regulatory body and
instead dictates policy outcomes, communications policy and consumers suf-
fer.
Aside from specific examples of the Commission's failure to achieve policy
goals as evidence for the need to move policy-making authority to the Execu-
tive, the grant of statutory authority to the FCC based on the public interest is
extremely broad, granting nearly unfettered discretion to the Commission to
pursue whatever public policies it chooses. 6 Courts have raised a wary eye-
brow to the constitutionality of a standard as vague as the public interest, but
have not yet struck it down.
262
But while the legality of the public interest standard is constitutional, it does
not follow that allowing the FCC to promulgate public policy under this stan-
dard constitutes good governance. It is possible that instead of making policy
in the public interest, the FCC has made policy first and then justified deci-
sions post-hoc by claiming that such decisions are in the public interest. Re-
Application for License and Authority to Provide National Broadband Radio Service in the
2155-2175 MHz Band, Application, WT Docket No. 07-16, at 1 (May 5, 2006) (accessible
via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System). The FCC later adopted some of M2Z's pro-
posals in the FNPRM in the docket. See In re Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services
in the 2155-2175 MHz Band; Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services in the 1915-
1920 MHz, 1995-2000 MHz, 2020-2025 MHz and 2175-2180 MHz Bands, Further Notice
of ProposedRulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 9859, 3 (June 20, 2008).
258 May, supra note 22, at 1324 ("[Chairman Powell] did, however, explicitly recognize
that as part of the executive branch, the agency at least would be more politically account-
able to the president in exercising whatever policymaking discretion Congress has dele-
gated.").
259 See Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services, Ex Parte of CTIA-The Wireless
Association, WT Docket Nos. 04-365, 07-195, at 4 (June 5, 2008).
260 See id.
261 See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DuKE L.J.
2023, 2066 (2008) ("Terms such as 'the public interest' are frequently viewed as conveying
broad policymaking authority-indeed, the more commonly voiced concern is that such a
delegation leaves the responsible agency official essentially unconstrained in setting pol-
icy.").
262 Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943).
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moving policy-making functions from the Commission would eliminate this
ambiguous standard, at least in terms of policymaking, an area of authority
much broader and less constrained than, for example, adjudicating interference
complaints.
Removing policy-making functions from the FCC and placing such respon-
sibilities in the executive branch also makes sense given the growing role of
worldwide regulatory structures.263 The growth of multinational communica-
tions corporations and alliances, as well as international traffic, has placed an
increased importance on international trade negotiations and trade laws.264 The
International Telecommunications Union ("ITU"), for example, is responsible
for the international allocation of spectrum.265 The State Department already
represents U.S. policy positions before the ITU with assistance from the FCC
and the NTIA.266 Given the President's nearly unilateral power regarding for-
eign policy and the role of the State Department in international affairs, the
executive branch is the natural home for responsibility for the federal govern-
ment's communications policy.
Transferring the policy-making function to the executive branch and leaving
the FCC as merely an adjudicatory agency is not without its downsides.267 First,
policy-making and regulatory actions take place in a dynamic environment,
and the stakeholders would react to such a change.268 While lawmakers are not
263 See Russ Taylor, Rethinking Reform of the FCC: A Reply to Randolph May, 58 FED.
COMM. L.J. 263, 275-76 (2006) (noting the growing role of regulatory structures with a
global jurisdiction, such as the World Trade Organization and the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers, and arguing that the "FCC may find itself unable to make
policy in a particular area because that role has been assigned to another, more internation-
ally-focused entity.").
264 See id Marks, supra note 80, at 201 (listing British Telecom, Sprint, Deutsche Tele-
kom, and France Telecom as multinational alliances).
265 Int'l Telecomm. Union, About ITU, http://www.itu.int/net/about/index.aspx (last
visited Mar. 27, 2009).
266 Angele A. Gilroy & Marcia S. Smith, The Federal Communications Commission:
What Role for the Future?, in THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION: WHAT ROLE?
31, 44 (Martha P. Largo, ed., 2004).
267 See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107
MICH. L. REv. 53, 55 (2008) ("Forcing the politically responsive president to share power
with a partially insulated, politically unresponsive bureaucracy tends to reduce the variance
in policy outcomes, because bureaucratic insulation creates a kind of compensatory inertia
that mutes the significance of variation in the president's policy preferences.").
268 See Taylor, supra note 263, at 274 ("The regulatory environment-that space or
arena in which debates occur and decisions are taken-is not static. A legal shift of control
over the FCC's policymaking functions to the executive branch would be followed by coun-
tershifts and not just from Congress."); see also David A. Curran, Rethinking Federal Re-
view of Telecommunications Mergers, 28 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 747, 779 n.204 (2002) (noting
that Congress may not find it in their interest to give more control of the policy apparatus of
the government to the executive branch, even if executive agencies-compared to inde-
pendent agencies-served the public better).
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fortune-tellers with the ability to see future outcomes of legislation, it does not
follow that reasoned and considered approaches to identified problems should
not be acted upon for a lack of certainty regarding their ultimate effect.
Second, the proliferation of independent agencies occurred partially due to a
belief that such entities are better insulated against politics, which interfere
with decision-making. 6 9 Whether that is true in practice is a matter of lively
academic debate.27 ° Regardless, there should be no doubt that political games-
manship occurs at the Commission in its operations, regulatory decision-
making, and personnel management. 7 ' Aside from broad level reform of the
regulatory structure, specific policies need to be implemented.
Precedent demonstrates that the abolition of regulatory agencies may be
more effective than attempted improvement. Both the ICC and the Civil Aero-
nautics Board ("CAB") were abolished, and their jurisdictions were transferred
to the executive branch. 72 The ICC regulated entry and exit of service provid-
ers in the railroad market, 3 as well as in the trucking industry.274 Utilizing com-
mon carrier regulations, the ICC forced railroads to run unprofitable routes and
created an oligopoly in the trucking industry.27 The ICC was abolished in
1995, after Congress, over the course of twenty-five years, had eliminated
many aspects of the ICC's regulatory jurisdiction.276 Congress shifted part of
the ICC's responsibility to the Department of Transportation ("DOT") under
the new Surface Transportation Board ("STB"), which is described as an
agency with reduced independence.277
269 May, supra note 22, at 1310.
270 See, e.g., Barron, supra note 66, at 1095 (examining the reality of presidents "at-
tempt[ing] to order administrative agencies to comply with .. .preferred policy prescrip-
tions").
271 See Devins & Lewis, supra note 189, at 459; see also Peter DiCola, Note, Choosing
Between the Necessity and Public Interest Standards in FCC Review of Media Ownership
Rules, 106 MICH. L. REV. 101, 129(2007).
272 May, supra note 22, at 1323; see Kearney, FCC Go the Way, supra note 170, at 1156
(discussing the elimination of the ICC and the transfer of some of its jurisdiction to the Sur-
face Transportation Board within the Department of Transportation); Duffy, supra note 35,
at 1119 (noting that Congress dissolved the Civil Aeronautics Board).
273 See Speta, Internet Time, supra note 76, at 1078-79; Read & Weiner, supra note 2, at
308 (noting that the goals for railroad regulation were to: "minimize competition; ... pro-
vide universal service to the public; and ... protect agricultural product shippers from ex-
ploitation by the railroad cartels").
274 See Speta, Internet Time, supra note 76, at 1074.
275 Id. at 1074-75, 1078 & n.56 (noting a number of laws passed that eased the regula-
tions regarding entry and exit in the railroad market, beginning in 1970, including the Rail
Passenger Service Act of 1970, the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, the Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, and the Staggers Rail Act of 1980).
276 ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (codified at 49
U.S.C. § 701 (2000)); Kearney, FCC Go the Way, supra note 170, at 1156.
277 Custos, supra note 222, at 618 (describing the independence of agencies such as the
STB as reduced because of "its non incorporation into a department ... and [being] headed
20091
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
Just like the common carrier provisions of the 1934 Act, the CAB regulated
the airline industry through economic regulations such as rate regulation and
control over market entry and exit.278 When Congress passed the Airline De-
regulation Act of 1978, it mandated the abolishment of the board seven years
following its passage and granted DOT jurisdiction over CAB's remaining
functions. 279 Furthermore, in abolishing the CAB, "Congress expressly pre-
empted state regulation relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier
having authority ... to provide interstate air transportation. ' '28" The abolishment
of the ICC and the CAB offer evidence that regulatory agencies can be disman-
tled and reformed-specifically by reallocating agency functions to the Execu-
tive Branch-in a workable manner.
2. Reformed Transparency
The Government in Sunshine Act ("Sunshine Act")28' prohibits all federal
agencies consisting of more than two commissioners or members, like the
FCC, from meeting together unless the meeting is open to the public.282 De-
signed to open government processes to the public, the Sunshine Act has had
the perverse effect of preventing FCC commissioners from discussing their
concerns regarding matters before an official Commission meeting.283 This
well-intentioned legislation should be revisited with the goal of greater Com-
mission cohesiveness by allowing the decision-makers to discuss pending
agenda items in advance of official meetings. While counter-arguments sug-
gest that closing the door to the public regarding government decision-making
is ill advised, there must be a way to uphold the spirit of the Sunshine Act,
without prohibiting basic communication between commissioners. Currently,
this prohibition simply enhances the prestige and power of the commissioners'
by an administrator who can be discharged at will by the President.").
278 See Speta, Internet Time, supra note 76, at 1071.
279 Id. at 1071-72 & n.23.
280 Cooper & Koukoutchos, supra note 24, at 311.
28 1 Government in Sunshine Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (codified in
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)).
282 5 U.S.C. § 552b(b) (2006).
283 See Oversight of the Federal Communications Commission: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and the Internet, 110th Cong. 22, 25 (2007) (statement
of Michael Copps, Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n).
I encourage you to consider modifying the closed meeting rules so that the five Com-
missioners ... aren't just together in their act one time a month or a year or whatever it
is up here, but let us get our act together down at the Commission. Let more than two
Commissioners get together and meet and talk. I cannot think of a proceeding at the
FCC that would not have been improved by our ability to get together and talk.
[Vol. 17
FCC Reform
high-level staff members, who are not subject to such restrictions on discussing
pending Commission matters.
Once policy-making functions are removed from the FCC, the new admini-
stration should not seek specific policy means that drive desired outcomes for
the communications industry, except perhaps in the broadest terms. Technolo-
gies are simply moving too fast for government to try to influence the means of
achieving the end goals and desired outcomes. Instead, the new administration
should seek outcome-driven policies to ensure a policy structure that reflects
the dynamic nature of the communications industry. 84 What has happened with
the FCC in its traditional form is that the communications industry ossifies
around the regulation once enacted--even if the industry did not support the
regulation in the first place-and it becomes more difficult to remove the regu-
lation because the industry reacts by reorganizing its business models around
the regulation. Outcome-driven policies let the market's power and efficiency-
enhancing properties work, prevent this ossification, and let the industry and
the market drive new technologies, not regulation.
In a competitive marketplace, there is no longer a need for an industry-
specific agency for protection of consumers; investigation and enforcement of
consumer complaints regarding communications services should be completely
moved to the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC").285 The FTC does not possess
jurisdiction over telecommunications providers who are subject to Title II's
common carrier regulation.286 The FTC has expressed a willingness to serve a
greater role in consumer protection regarding communications services,28 and
in 2006, the FTC announced the creation of an Internet Access Task Force to
examine the issue of net neutrality. 8 Additionally, Congress has taken first
steps to transfer authority for enforcement of consumer protection to the
284 See, e.g., Werbach, Digital Tornado, supra note 9, at 5 (seeking to promote a greater
understanding "of the unique policy issues the Internet raises").
285 See Scott Cooper, Technology and Competition Come to Telecommunications: Reex-
amining Exemptions to the Federal Trade Commission Act, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 963, 968
(1997) (arguing that the FTC should have jurisdiction over consumer protection issues in the
communications industry, and "[als limited choice gives way to a myriad of options, propo-
sitions and solicitations, the role of the regulator must change from administrator of retail
utility services to enforcer of consumer protections in an open marketplace.").
286 Weiser, Next Frontier, supra note 81, at 289 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 44, 45(a)(2)
(2000)).
287 See Anne Veigle, Senate Commerce Wants Prepaid Calling Card Reforms, COMM.
DAILY, Sept. 11, 2008, at 3. The Chairman of the FTC has sought to rollback the prohibition
of FTC enforcement against common carriers, citing the FTC's "extensive expertise with
advertising, marketing, billing and collection, areas in which significant problems have
emerged in the telecommunications industry." Id.
288 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Chairman Addresses Issue of "Net Neutral-
ity," Aug. 21, 2006, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/08/neutrality.shtm; Bara Vaida, The New
Overseers?, NAT'L J., Sept. 9, 2006, at 66.
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FTC.289
Furthermore, the FCC's own actions have already expanded the FTC's ju-
risdiction over new communications technologies and services.29 ' Easing such
a transition of authority to the FTC is the reality that the FCC has come under
fire for its lackluster consumer protection efforts; a report from the Govern-
ment Accountability Office ("GAO") found the FCC closed over eighty-
percent of its investigations based on consumer complaints without an en-
forcement action between 2003 and 2006.9 For the forgoing reasons, the
FCC's role in enforcing consumer protection in the communications industry
should be relocated to the FTC.
Without its policy-making or consumer protection authority, the Commis-
sion should return to its original purpose of serving as an adjudicatory body, a
goal all the more important in what portends to be an era of aggressive compe-
tition among companies, no doubt requiring mediation when necessary. Ad-
ministrative law professor Louis Jaffe noted, independent agencies should not
dictate "industrial policies," but serve as the source of "regulation of an indus-
try."'2 92 The Commission's adjudicatory role should not be between consumers
and corporations, but between corporations as they compete in the market-
place.293 While policy-making functions would be transferred to the executive
branch, the FCC would still have an important role to play in three key areas:
spectrum management, enforcement, and interconnection disputes.
3. Powers the FCC Should Retain
The FCC should retain its spectrum management authority to enforce the
rights of spectrum licensees and protect against interference. 94 As the Com-
289 The House of Representatives unanimously passed H.R. 3402, which carved out an
exception to the FCC's exclusive jurisdiction over common carriers for the prosecution of
fraud in the prepaid calling card industry. Anne Veigle, The House Late Thursday Passed
HR-3403, COMM. DAILY, Sept. 29, 2008, at 11.
290 See Weiser, Next Frontier, supra note 81, at 289. The result of the FCC classifying
new technologies and services, such as cable modem and DSL offerings, under Title I is that
the FTC is able to expand its jurisdiction over broadband service providers because the pro-
viders are no longer considered common carriers. Id.
291 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FCC HAS MADE SOME PROGRESS IN THE MAN-
AGEMENT OF ITS ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM, BUT FACES LIMITATIONS, AND ADDITIONAL Ac-
TIONS ARE NEEDED, 19-20 fig. 5 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d08l25.pdf
292 Duffy, supra note 35, at 1136.
293 This idea is not new and, perhaps, is what the Commission would argue it already
does. See FCC Strategic Plan, supra note 18, at 3-4 (outlining the goal for the Commission
moving forward as "enforc[ing] the rules so that business compete fairly" and "promote
competition, open markets, and technological innovation").
294 Kearney, FCC Go the Way, supra note 170, at 1198-99 (acknowledging that the FCC
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mission brings more spectrum to the market29 and technologies develop that
allow for more efficient use of spectrum, 296 Philip Weiser and Dale Hatfield
argue that "the FCC must develop the institutional abilities to function as a
'spectrum court' to avoid employing a quasi-legislative approach to managing
spectrum" and suggest the use of administrative law judges in such a court.2 97
Furthermore, any legislation overhauling the Commission should revamp
the traditional Title III regulatory framework for spectrum management and
policy. Despite improvement in bringing more spectrum to the market, the
Commission has not altered the policy goals behind the regulatory model of
Title III. For example, the 1996 Telecom Act provided the FCC the option of
giving additional spectrum to television broadcasters to aid in the digital televi-
sion transition.298 The FCC promptly gave away the spectrum to the broadcast-
ers, but without much discussion of the structure of public interest obligations
the broadcasters would have to serve in return for the free spectrum.29 9 Indeed,
such a discussion would have been-and continues to be-very timely because
the justification for imposing public interest obligations on broadcasters, spec-
trum scarcity, is rapidly becoming obsolete.3" Regardless of the ultimate result
still has a role to play in spectrum allocation, service rule development, assignment of li-
censes, enforcement, and interference protection).
295 See, e.g., Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Spectrum Policy Task Force Report 1 (2002),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-228542A 1 .pdf
296 See Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless Commu-
nications, 82 TEX. L. REv. 863, 896-98 (2004) (discussing a number of technologies that
enable efficient use of spectrum, including cognitive radios).
297 Philip J. Weiser & Dale Hatfield, Spectrum Policy Reform and the Next Frontier of
Property Rights, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 549, 601-02 (2008).
298 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 107-08
(codified in 47 U.S.C. § 336(a)).
299 See In re Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact upon the Existing Televi-
sion Broadcast Service, Fifth Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 2 (Apr. 3, 1997).
President Clinton did create and advisory committee to examine the public interest obliga-
tions of digital television broadcasters, however, the recommendations largely have not been
implemented. Advisory Committee on Public Interest Obligations of Digital Television
Broadcasters, Exec. Order No. 13,038, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,065, 12,065 (Mar. 11, 1997).
300 HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW § 9.3 (1999) (noting
that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 recognizes that the broadcasters no longer control
the levers of "electronic mass communication" given direct broadcast satellite, Internet, and
cable television, and hence, a regulatory model based on spectrum scarcity and the power of
broadcasters is losing justification); Sascha D. Meinrath & Victor W. Pickard, The New
Network Neutrality: Criteria for Internet Freedom, 12 INT'L J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 225, 234-
35 (2008) (arguing that the FCC's licensing model has failed to evolve to take into account
digital technologies and leads to entrenched licensees heading the opposition against for-
ward-thinking shifts in spectrum use, such as low-power FM, interference temperature and
unlicensed use of spectrum). See Tribune Co. v. FCC, 133 F.3d 61, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has obliquely suggested it might reconsider that doctrine
on the FCC's 'signal ... that technological developments have advanced so far that some
revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be required."' (quoting FCC v. League of
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of the spectrum management reform debate-whether to embrace a property
rights model3"' or the commons model3°2-the FCC would be tasked with an
adjudicatory role regarding spectrum disputes in either construct.3 0 3
In an era of spectrum abundance, where multiple platforms exist to receive
audio and video content, commentators have proposed a "play or pay" regula-
tory regime for broadcasters accompanied with enhanced public disclosure."
One commentator suggested a play or pay regulatory structure where "broad-
casters are given a choice between complying with public interest requirements
or paying someone else to put public interest programming on the air."3 5 This
new regulatory framework makes sense for a number of reasons: it would re-
move First Amendment concerns regarding content regulation of broadcasting;
public broadcasting entities that want to create educational programming
would have a dedicated revenue stream; broadcasters would now be treated by
regulators like cable and the Internet; the FTC could have jurisdiction to en-
force multiple-ownership rules;30 6 the Department of Justice could enforce in-
decency laws under existing authority;3" and technology in cable set-top boxes,
like the V-Chip, could eliminate concerns over parental control over indecent
content.3"8
Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376-77 n.l (1984))).
301 See Ellen P. Goodman, Spectrum Rights in the Telecosm to Come, 41 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 269, 370-71 (2004). Under a property rights system, the government would no longer
allocate spectrum, but would serve as a judicial body for spectrum disputes using the guide-
lines of well-developed common law principles of nuisance and trespass. Id. at 323 & n. 163.
302 See id. at 272. Under a commons model, the FCC would not be in the business of
deciding who uses the spectrum, but in deciding how users exist with each other in the spec-
trum through interference rules an end-user device standards. Id. at 372-73.
303 See id. at 323, 372-73After thoroughly examining how the common law principals of
nuisance and trespass would apply to the adjudication of interference claims in a property
rights model of spectrum management and exploring the procedural and administrative chal-
lenges of implementing spectrum conflict resolution mechanism in a commons model,
Goodman concludes, "[t]he regulatory agency must play a continuing role in the resolution
of spectrum conflict." Id. at 404.
304 See Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REv. 499, 504-
05 (2000) (arguing that enhanced disclosure requirements for broadcasters would enable
government regulatory activity through "public pressure," noting that it would be the "sim-
plest and least intrusive of regulatory instruments").
305 Sunstein, supra note 304, at 538.
306 Aarons, supra note 38, at 336 (discussing the value of enhanced cross-ownership
rules in this new structure because "economic scarcity is a great barrier to diversity").
307 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006) ("Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane lan-
guage by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.").
308 Henry Geller, The Gore Commission, 10 Years Later: The Public Interest of Digital
TV Broadcasters in Perfect Hindsight, Address at George Mason University School of Law:
the Information Economy Project (Oct. 3, 2008), available at http://iep.gmu.edu/assets/
media/ gorecommission/3.mp3.
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Further, the FCC would continue to play an important role regarding the in-
terconnection disagreements among RBOCs because ILECs control over local
networks necessitates a "regulator that can adjudicate interconnection dis-
putes."3" An independent agency with bi-partisan membership would serve the
purpose of a more neutral adjudicatory body of disputes between members of
the communication industry. Indeed, the original purpose of the FCC was to
make efficient sense of limited spectrum and usage by broadcasters."' Given
the growing need for the limited commercial spectrum currently available,"'
this would be a large and important task for the Commission."2
VI. CONCLUSION
The time to reform the FCC is now. Many of the historic justifications for
the Commission's regulatory models and policy goals no longer apply to mod-
em communications technologies, devices, and services. The FCC should re-
turn to its roots as an adjudicatory body, particularly as competition between
converging companies escalates,"3 but with stronger federal preemption pow-
ers. The Commission's role in managing spectrum should continue, but no
longer with spectrum scarcity as the regulatory justification. Network neutral-
ity should be codified as the natural continuation of the Commission embrac-
ing competition and deregulation. Policy-making functions should be moved to
the executive branch, particularly given the role that technology and communi-
cations play in the world economic structure today.
309 Kearney, FCC Go the Way, supra note 170, at 1198 (arguing that the FCC will con-
tinue to exist because of the need for an agency to adjudicate disputes regarding intercon-
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